[EM] Some myths about voting methods

[Juho Laatu]

P.S. Below I should have said that Nader
would be a Condorcet winner or winner in
Condorcet methods etc.

--- On Sat, 6/6/09, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> From: Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Some myths about voting methods
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Saturday, 6 June, 2009, 10:51 AM
> 
> --- On Fri, 5/6/09, Warren Smith <warren.wds at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > Now consider tactics.
> 
> > In contrast, with
> > preferential ballot, the
> > number of possible
> > exaggerated-tactical-style votes is
> >    {Dem > Nader > Repub} 
> > and  {Repub > Nader > Dem}
> > which is only 2 options.
> 
> Do you have an exact definition for
> what votes are acceptable as
> sensible(?) rank-order votes here?
> 
> Note also that this voting style is
> insane in the sense that if we get
> 50:D>N>R 50:R>N>D then one vote to
> Nader would make him the winner
> (even if all others would find him
> least preferred).
> 
> 
> 
> This discussion was mainly about the
> amount of information that different
> votes carry. Note however that the
> meaning of the vote is already a
> different story. Range votes are
> richer than rank-order votes in the
> sense that A>B could be A=9 B=8 or
> A=9 B=7. But on the other hand vote
> A>B>C where the voter expresses
> maximum preference on "A>B" and "B>C"
> at the same time can not be expressed
> in Range.
> 
> Juho
> 
> 
> 
> 
>       
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