[EM] Schulze definition (was: information content, game theory, cooperation)

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Sun Jun 7 15:12:27 PDT 2009


Dear Raph,

> Schulze and ranked pairs are the only methods that meet clone 
> independence and the condorcet rule.

Nope. River, too, of course, meets all three criteria...


> 
> Does ranked pairs fail the Smith criterion?
> 
> I would change B to "If there is a group of candidates all preferred 
> over all candidates outside the group, then only those candidates may 
> win and the candidates outside the group may have no effect on the 
> result".
> 
> If you don't restrict the winner to the Smith set (which your rules 
> don't necessarily), then you could end up with a non-condorcet method.
> 
> Also, just because the popular/proposed condorcet methods are 
> excluded by your definition doesn't mean that some other weird method 
> can't be found that also meets the rule.
> 
> It might be better to just include the reasons that you like Sculze 
> and use those rules rather than trying to select Sculze by a process 
> of elimination.
> 
> BTW it would be nice if the wikipedia page would actually contain 
> something describing Schulze method, not just the heuristics.
> The best I have found so far is:
> http://rangevoting.org/SchulzeExplan.html
> "Therefore, my aim was to find a method that satisfies Condorcet, 
> monotonicity, clone-immunity, majority for solid coalitions, and 
> reversal symmetry, and that tends to produce winners with weak worst 
> pairwise defeats (compared to the worst pairwise defeat of the winner 
> of Tideman's Ranked Pairs method)."
> 
> Yeah. Though, ofc, Schulze isn't allow to edit the article.
> 
> Could someone on this list give a brief outline or the formal rule (
> actually his statutory rules are probably it)?
> 
> ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for 
> 
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