[EM] Schulze definition (was: information content, game theory, cooperation)
Jobst Heitzig
heitzig-j at web.de
Sun Jun 7 15:12:27 PDT 2009
Dear Raph,
> Schulze and ranked pairs are the only methods that meet clone
> independence and the condorcet rule.
Nope. River, too, of course, meets all three criteria...
>
> Does ranked pairs fail the Smith criterion?
>
> I would change B to "If there is a group of candidates all preferred
> over all candidates outside the group, then only those candidates may
> win and the candidates outside the group may have no effect on the
> result".
>
> If you don't restrict the winner to the Smith set (which your rules
> don't necessarily), then you could end up with a non-condorcet method.
>
> Also, just because the popular/proposed condorcet methods are
> excluded by your definition doesn't mean that some other weird method
> can't be found that also meets the rule.
>
> It might be better to just include the reasons that you like Sculze
> and use those rules rather than trying to select Sculze by a process
> of elimination.
>
> BTW it would be nice if the wikipedia page would actually contain
> something describing Schulze method, not just the heuristics.
> The best I have found so far is:
> http://rangevoting.org/SchulzeExplan.html
> "Therefore, my aim was to find a method that satisfies Condorcet,
> monotonicity, clone-immunity, majority for solid coalitions, and
> reversal symmetry, and that tends to produce winners with weak worst
> pairwise defeats (compared to the worst pairwise defeat of the winner
> of Tideman's Ranked Pairs method)."
>
> Yeah. Though, ofc, Schulze isn't allow to edit the article.
>
> Could someone on this list give a brief outline or the formal rule (
> actually his statutory rules are probably it)?
>
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