[EM] Schulze definition (was: information content, game theory, cooperation)
Raph Frank
raphfrk at gmail.com
Sun Jun 7 15:00:46 PDT 2009
On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 10:20 PM, Juho Laatu<juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> It could be thus enough to say:
> - The electors rank the candidates
> according to their preferences.
> - If some candidate is preferred over
> all other candidates then that
> candidate shall be elected.
I think that Smith compliance should be required. Condorcet
compliance on its own isn't that great.
Frankly, even if 1 condorcet method is better than others, going from
plurality to any Condorcet/Smith method is a massive improvement.
Also, the benefit to the politicians is pretty small from picking a
horrible condorcet method, so hopefully they won't bother (though
maybe that is overly trusting).
If an added criteria is needed, then maybe add clone independence.
However, then you are adding more complexity.
"Do you want the voting method to be one where
The voters rank the candidates, and,
unranked candidates are considered equal worst, and,
a candidate is considered preferred to another if he is preferred by a
majority of the voters who express a preference, and,
If a candidate is ranked first on a majority of the ballots, then that
candidate wins, and,
if a candidate is preferred to all other candidates, then that
candidate wins, and,
If every candidate in a group of candidates is preferred to all
candidates outside the group, then one of them wins
?
"
This has some redundant clauses, but adding them actually makes it
clearer (I think). In, theory you only need the last one as the
other 2 rules automatically follow.
Maybe you could submit one that only requires condorcet compliance as
the 3 clause is complex.
Btw, does Schulze allow equal rankings?
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