[EM] Strategies for RRV/RSV and BR for multi-member constituencies

Juho Laatu juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Fri Jan 30 14:09:47 PST 2009

--- On Wed, 28/1/09, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 8:39 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:
> > The "construct the assembly and then let it
> vote" approach might be
> > reducible to ordinary Bayesian Regret. The idea would
> be this: single-winner
> > BR assigns utilities to all candidates and voters.
> Call the candidates'
> > utilities their "defined utilities".
> You would need one for each dimension that is being tested.
> However, a assembly made up of clones would also vote the
> same way as
> the people, if they were purely centrist.
> This is kinda the same point I made in my post.  Would a
> voter prefer
> an assembly with higher average utility of the candidates,
> or one
> where he has 1 candidate who is an exact clone of him.

I don't know what the voter would
think. Maybe some voters think that
the two alternatives are equal.
Maybe most prefer the latter

In any case the first alternative
may lead sooner to situations where
the representatives make different
decisions than the voters would.



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