[EM] "Beatpath GMC" compliance a mistaken standard?

[Chris Benham]

Kevin,

You wrote (25 Jan 2009):

"I think there ought to be a clear distinction between criteria whose
violation is "absurd" no matter what the circumstances, and criteria
whose violation is "absurd" due to other available options."

I don't see why (particularly).

"There are very few (named) criteria whose failure I'd call "absurd" no
matter what."

Of those criteria, which is the one you consider to be the least absurd?
(Or if you can't say, just name some.)

> Does your question mean that this really is how you view the
> difference between CDTT and Mutual Majority, is in terms of
> the candidates of the winning set sharing a probability pie?"
> 
> Not exactly. No-one has ever suggested  "MM,Random Ballot" as a 
> good method and few have suggested  that sometimes the clearly most
> appropriate winner is not in the MM set (as I have regarding the CDTT set).

"I think that either isn't relevant or doesn't help your case."

Then you can regard "that" as a rhetorical aside. To answer your question again
I would say that way of putting it seems too mild to me, but I can't see that it's
irrational.

"The question is about why you view MM's behavior as qualitatively different
from CDTT's behavior, when in practice, in a real method, it's exactly the same 
behavior."

In a previous message I think I made it clear that I don't accept that it is "exactly
the same behavior".

[I don't accept that 'being tossed out of the favoured (not excluded from winning)
set' is exactly "the same phenomenon" as 'being joined by others in the favoured set'.]

"Well, supposing that the public decided to accept a method that failed
a positional criterion, I guess at that time I would drop that criterion."

Does that mean that you think all "positional criteria" have no value other than to appease
misguided members  of  the public?

"Hypothetically if the public were willing to accept any method I would
propose to them, and not question any of its results, then I wouldn't care
about appearances. I would just give them the method that I felt would
perform the best."

In this context, what  do you mean by "appearances"?  How can a method that you "feel 
performs the best" have (in your eyes) anything wrong with its "appearance"?

Chris Benham



Hi Chris,

--- En date de : Ven 23.1.09, Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> a écrit :
> "I can't see what's so highly absurd about
> failing mono-append. It's
> basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that
> doesn't seem
> especially more important. Is it absurd to fail
> mono-raise?"
> 
> The absurdity of failing mono-append is compounded by the
> cheapness of
> meeting it. As with mono-add-plump the quasi-intelligent
> device is given
> simple and pure new information. Being confused by it is
> simply unforgivable
> *stupidity* on the part of  the
> quasi-"intelligent" device.

I find it unclear how to decide whether something is unforgivably stupid
in your view, or instead mitigated by something like this:

> Regards mono-raise, I would say that failing it is
> obviously 'positionally absurd'
> and 'pairwise absurd' but perhaps not  'LNH
> absurd'.  We know that it isn't 
> "absurd" in the sense that mono-add-plump and
> mono-append is, because it is 
> failed by a method that has a "maximal set" of 
> (IMO) desirable criterion compliances .

It seems to me like a real problem that the absurdity of failing a
criterion can depend on whether better criteria require that it be
failed. I think this is just "cheapness" again. Failing mono-raise
isn't absurd, because mono-raise is relatively expensive.

I think there ought to be a clear distinction between criteria whose
violation is "absurd" no matter what the circumstances, and criteria
whose violation is "absurd" due to other available options.

There are very few (named) criteria whose failure I'd call "absurd" no
matter what.

> > Can I take it then that you no longer like 
> > "CDTT,Random Ballot", which does award
> > a probability "pie"?
> 
> "Sure. Does your question mean that this really is how
> you view the
> difference between CDTT and Mutual Majority, is in terms of
> the candidates
> of the winning set sharing a probability pie?"
> 
> Not exactly. No-one has ever suggested  "MM,Random
> Ballot" as a good method and few
> have suggested  that sometimes the clearly most
> appropriate winner is not in the MM set
> (as I have regarding the CDTT set).

I think that either isn't relevant or doesn't help your case. The
question is about why you view MM's behavior as qualitatively different
from CDTT's behavior, when in practice, in a real method, it's exactly
the same behavior. If the important thing is how many people suggest
that the clearly best winner is not in the MM or CDTT sets, then there
doesn't seem to be a good reason to bring up mono-add-plump.

> > The criterion/standard is an end in itself.  Not
> > everything is about the strategy game.
> > Higer SU with sincere voting and sparing the method
> > common-sense  (at least) difficult -to-counter
> complaints 
> > from the positional-minded are worthwhile
> accomplisments.
> 
> "This strikes me as an unusual amount of paranoia that
> the method's
> results can't be explained to the public's
> satisfaction unless it's
> similar to Approval."
> 
> It isn't just "the public". It is myself
> wearing my "common-sense positional" hat. And it
> isn't just
> "Approval", it's  'Approval and/or
> FPP'.

Well, supposing that the public decided to accept a method that failed
a positional criterion, I guess at that time I would drop that criterion.
Hypothetically if the public were willing to accept any method I would
propose to them, and not question any of its results, then I wouldn't care
about appearances. I would just give them the method that I felt would
perform the best.

Kevin


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