[EM] Why the concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed.

[Juho Laatu]

OK. Then the model is one where the
voters may have various opinions on
various matters but that doesn't
necessarily mean that they would
have a complete ordering of the
candidates.

I can imagine that I could have e.g.
cyclic opinions on food when there
are three alternatives and three
properties that I consider important
(e.g. low fat, sweetness, nice colour)
and of which I have clear opinions.
With these parameters my preferences
could thus form a logical cycle.

People have however also good
problem solving abilities. If I'm in
a restaurant sooner or later I'm
usually able to make up my mind.
Maybe by giving some weights to my
preferences and then choosing my
favourite food for today. I may also
need to create opinions on topics
that I had not thought before.

As a result I may have mapped my
(already existing and maybe newly
generated) logical rankings of
different properties to ratings
(that are transitive by nature).

What I mean is that it may quite OK
to assume that people are able to
find some preference order when
voting. And therefore we can force
them to do so.

Juho



--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de> wrote:

> From: Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why the concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed.
> To: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>, juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
> Date: Friday, 23 January, 2009, 4:51 PM
> Dear Juho,
> 
> > OK. I interpret this to mean that
> "sincerity"
> > referred to the sincere opinion that might
> > not even exist. 
> 
> I did not mean to say the voter has no opinion. He may well
> hold the opinion that, say, A is much better than B in some
> respect, and B is much better than A in another respect, so
> that neither is A preferable to B nor B to A nor are they
> equivalent (equally preferable). This is just an ordinary
> case of what some people pejoratively call
> "incomplete" preferences. Or the voter may hold
> the opinion that A is better than B in two of three
> respects, B is better than C in two of three respects, and C
> is better than A in two of three respects, so that A is
> strictly preferable to B, B to C, and C to A. This would be
> a case of "complete" but cyclic preferences. Or,
> even more simple, A and B may just be completely equivalent,
> so that neither is preferable to the other. In all these
> cases, a "favourite" is inexistent, not just
> unknown. 
> 
> > For a voter that doesn't have a sincere
> > opinion it is also difficult to vote in any
> > way (not just sincerely). 
> 
> Again, I talk about voters who *do* have sincere opinions
> which however happen do not fall into the narrow set of
> possible opinions the voting method's designer cared to
> take serious. The problem is on the designer's side, not
> on the voter's. One must not assume that such thiings as
> "favourites" always exist or that preferences are
> complete or transitive as long as one cannot prove that this
> is indeed the case for all voters. And by "prove"
> I don't mean "show its validity in some arbitrary
> narrow-minded economic model of utility".
> 
> One does not have all these problems when one avoids to
> speak of "sincere" votes!
> 
> Yours, Jobst
> 
> > --- On Wed, 21/1/09, Jobst Heitzig
> <heitzig-j at web.de> wrote:
> > 
> > > From: Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de>
> > > Hi Juho!
> > > 
> > > > What is the problem with
> > > > sincerity in Plurality?
> > > 
> > > Well, that's simple: Any voter who does not
> have a
> > > unique favourite option (whether that is because
> of
> > > indifference or uncertainty or because of cyclic
> > > preferences) cannot vote "sincerely" in
> Plurality!
> > > 
> > > Yours, Jobst
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > .... and the older mail ...
> > 
> > 
> > --- On Fri, 16/1/09, Jobst Heitzig
> <heitzig-j at web.de> wrote:
> > 
> > > To determine how I should vote, is that quite
> complicated
> > > or does it depend on what I think how others will
> vote?
> > >
> > > Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently
> easy to
> > > determine from my preferences and independent of
> the other
> > > voters?
> > >
> > > If the latter is the case, the method deserves to
> be called
> > > "strategy-free". The whole thing has
> nothing to do
> > > with "sincerity". Refering to
> > > "sincerity", that concept in itself
> being
> > > difficult to define even for methods as simple as
> Plurality,
> > > complicates the strategy discussion
> unnecessarily.
> > 
> > Are you looking for the English language
> > meaning of sincerity or some technical
> > definition of it (e.g. some voting related
> > criterion)? What is the problem with
> > sincerity in Plurality?
> > 
> > Juho
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >       
> > 
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see
> http://electorama.com/em for list info
> >