[EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting
davek at clarityconnect.com
Fri Jan 23 17:36:55 PST 2009
On Fri, 23 Jan 2009 12:47:53 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> At 05:41 AM 1/21/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>> My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more
>>> complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there will
>>> be only two, why have Approval in the first place?). You support A >
>>> B > C. If A is in the lead, you can approve of A alone. If A's a
>>> minor party, then you should approve of both A and B. But if the
>>> parties are close, then it may not be clear who you should approve -
>>> if A's slightly too low (and the important contest is A vs C), then
>>> voting only A will split the vote and may cause C to be elected
>>> instead of B. If A's not that low (and the important contest is A vs
>>> B), then voting both A and B will cancel your vote for A with your
>>> vote for B. It becomes more difficult the closer the parties are in
>>> support, and polling errors could cause further problems.
>> Approval works within a multiple election environment, classically it
>> wasn't used with anything other than a true majority requirement, and
>> it was probably expected that initial votes would be bullet votes.
>> Approval as a deterministic method that must find a winner with a
>> single ballot is simply a more sophisticated, improved form of
>> Plurality, as is IRV, but Approval is far simpler.
>> The scenario described is unusual in partisan elections, but I
>> certainly wouldn't propose Approval as an ideal election method. It is
>> merely the largest improvement that can be accomplished with such a
>> minimal shift from Plurality: just start to count all the votes. Dump
>> the no-overvoting rules.
> I'll say again: if there are more than two viable parties, the this
> could happen. If there will be only two viable parties, why use Approval?
Count of parties is not useful. Usually there are only two leading
candidates and election method matters little.
Trouble is, occasionally there are more leading candidates, as in the
example below, and, THEN, methods matter.
Whether this was truly center-squeeze or not, the idea applies - two
candidates off to the side, each with a bunch of dedicated followers, and a
bunch of candidates sharing the center votes.
> As a concrete example, consider the 2002 French Presidential election.
> You support Bayrou - are you going to approve of Jospin alone, or of
> both Jospin and Chirac? You probably don't know that the Le Pen
> supporters are as powerful as they are, so you approve only of Jospin.
> Then the runoff picks Le Pen and Chirac. If there had been no runoff,
> Chirac would have won outright, which is better than Le Pen, but not
> what you wanted.
> Of course, you may say that if the method was approval, others would
> have voted in styles different from bullet-voting, but I'm trying to
> show a problem; and if it's true what you say, that most people will
> bullet vote, then the scenario is all the more plausible.
As with Approval, Condorcet voters have choices:
Dedicated followers of the two on the side likely bullet vote.
Center voters properly vote for a bunch of center candidates - hoping
one such will win.
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
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