[EM] Generalizing "manipulability"

Juho Laatu juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Sat Jan 17 16:31:13 PST 2009

The mail contained quite good

I didn't however agree with the
referenced part below. I think "sincere"
and "zero-knowledge best strategic"
ballot need not be the same. For example
in Range(0,99) my sincere ballot could
be A=50 B=51 but my best strategic vote
would be A=0 B=99. Also other methods
may have similarly small differences
between "sincere" and "zero-knowledge
best strategic" ballots.


--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com> wrote:

> The generalization of a "sincere" ballot then
> becomes the zero-knowledge (of other voters' behavior)
> ballot, although we might still want to talk about a
> "sincere ordering" (that is, the sincere linear
> ballot) in trying to determine a "best possible"
> outcome.


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