[EM] "Beatpath GMC" compliance a mistaken standard?

Juho Laatu juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Sun Jan 11 09:57:20 PST 2009

--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:

> Let's consider the first election first, with
> truncation extended to full preference:
> 26: A > B > C
> 25: B > A > C
> 49: C > A = B

> 	A B C: 100 prefer {A B C} to the empty set

This case is interesting (not that it
would have any impact on the ongoing
mutual majority discussion but just
for theoretical interest).

The number of candidates was not exactly
stated in the example. If there are e.g.
four candidates then the votes would be:

26: A > B > C = D
25: B > A > C = D
49: C > A = B = D

Set {A, B, C} has in this case no support.

Let's assume that there are also other
citizens (=potential candidates who
are however not candidates) than the
named candidates. The opinions of the
first 26 voters could be as follows.

26: X1 > A > B > X2 > C = D = X3 > X4

The point here is that the voters have
not said that they would prefer A, B, C
and D to the other citizens / potential
candidates (X1, X2,...).

It is ok to say that if there are no
"mutual majorities" the winner can be
elected from the whole set of candidates
{A, B, C} or {A, B, C, D} or whatever set.
One can not say that the voters would
prefer the all the candidates (or those
that are named on the ballots) to other
citizens. What is the meaning of saying
that they prefer these candidates to an
empty set?



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