[EM] Fwd: Score DSV

[Jameson Quinn]

2009/8/29 Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>

> Hello,
>
> --- En date de : Sam 29.8.09, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com> a
> écrit :
> > I expect that Score DSV will have lower Bayesian Regret
> > than any other system, even score (aka range) voting, given
> > voters with any reasonable amount of non-false information
> > making a rational choice of strategies, with any given
> > (ideologically-biased or -unbiased) mix of minimum
> > expected-benefit thresholds for voting strategically rather
> > than honestly, as long as at least half of voters have an
> > "attainable" strategic threshold.
>
> I don't see why you would guess that Score DSV would have better
> Bayesian Regret than Range. It looks like you tried to make a method that
> helps a voter get the best result for himself, which isn't the same as
> getting the best result overall.


I tried to make a method where honesty was strategic. That means allowing
voters to usefully distinguish A>B>>C from A>>B>C or A=B>>C for any A, B,
and C. This method does that, which removes any need for strategy at all in
many cases, and gives defensive strategizers a chance to punish it in many
more.


>
>
> Warren defines BR in such a way that Range is unbeatable given sincere
> votes.


Absolutely, which is why I stated my BR challenge in terms of rational
voters where at least half have an attainable strategy threshold.


>
>
> If he measured your method, admitting strategic votes, he would make
> strategy assumptions that would make it look terrible.
>

Yep, which is why I (implicitly) offered to do the programming. My strategy
assumption is that voters will use strategy iff it has an expected value
greater than some threshold. This is a very easy bar to meet in the case of
Score voting (approval-style strategy is a painless win) and much harder in
the case of good Condorcet methods (where "good method", in my definition,
means that they reduce the cases in which strategy works, and increase the
cases in which it backfires, to the point where almost any voter with
less-than-perfect information has a negative expected value for strategy,
and even under perfect information only a tiny fraction of voters can
benefit from strategy). Therefore, *rational* strategic voters will be more
strategic under Score than under a good Condorcet method, giving the
Condorcet method a possible margin for victory. Score DSV, because it takes
the actual utilities into account sometimes, should have the widest victory,
if the differences are significant.

I realize this is all hot air until I actually program this. Yet it is at
least falsifiable hot air.


>
> Your wiki page seems to be lacking some proofs.


As in, all of them? :)

Guilty as charged. Which proofs would you like to see first? I make about 25
provable/disprovable claims on the page, that's a lot of work and it would
help if I knew which ones y'all wanted me to start with. (I already got
Markus to disprove one of my claims for me by posting here, so my evil plot
worked... thanks, Dr. Schulze :)

Jameson
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