[EM] Practical Democracy (and primary rule making) with Votorola

[Michael Allan]

Fred Gohlke wrote:
> ...  Can you give me the rationale for allowing voters to change
> their vote?  This is in no sense a criticism.  I just don't
> understand why you think this is a wise option.  My own initial
> reaction is to think it opens the process to manipulation,
> particularly by media-induced hysteria.  It also tends to insulate
> one from the consequences of ill-considered actions.  When a person
> makes a choice, is it not better to let them learn the significance
> of their choice so they are better prepared for the next election?

(Note: we are not speaking at this point of an electoral process.
 This has no bearing on the implementation of Practical Democracy,
 which, in any case, involves no vote shifting.  Rather we are
 speaking of primary voting in the context of normative composition,
 or rule making.)  Consider these two scenarios, from my docs:

  i) Juanita proposes to build a sandbox for children in the
     neighbourhood park (plan A).  Samantha agrees to this plan, and
     formally expresses her agreement by voting for Juanita. ^[1]

       http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory/park/acts.png

     Monika hears of Juanita's plan, and joins Samantha in voting for
     it.  She suggests, at the same time, that the sandbox ought to be
     larger than Juanita is proposing (plan B).  At this point,
     Samantha might shift her vote to Monika as a sign of approval for
     plan B, or she might keep it with Juanita.  She has a choice.
     The objects of the choice (Juanita and Monika, original and
     variant plans, A and B) are called candidates.

       http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory/park/candidates.png
     
     Monika, by continuing to vote for Juanita, even while proposing a
     somewhat different plan, might be hoping that Juanita will
     eventually agree to amend her own plan.  And Samantha, if she
     were to shift her vote to Monika, might be aiming to further that
     amendment.  So, with a single vote, Samantha could express her
     assent for both candidates, and her hope of seeing them work
     together.

       http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory/park/text-flow.png

 ii) Someone has initiated a proposal to change the Landlord and
     Tenant Act, and people are voting on it.  Nadia is concerned
     about the issue, because she lives in an apartment block.  But
     she's unsure how to vote, so she decides to vote for a friend who
     works at a real-estate agency.  And now she's with some
     neighbours and they're shaking their heads.  They say she's
     voting for the wrong version of the proposal - one that puts
     apartment dwellers at a disadvantage.  So she calls up her friend
     and asks, "Are you sure we're voting for the right version of the
     proposal?" ^[2]

Should these people be allowed to shift their votes?  You asked
specifically about the possibility of *guiding* those who are already
elected.  Such guidance is actually the purpose of this type of
voting, which we may call "primary" in the sense that it makes no
final decision, but simply recommends candidates for a secondary
decision process.  Here the candidates it recommends are norms,
specifically (i) a development plan, which is recommended for the
consideration of the municipal parks department and its elected
executive; and (ii) a legislative bill, which is recommended for the
consideration of the legislature and its elected members.

But these recommendations depend, I think, on vote shifting.  Vote
shifting provides the voters with (i) influence over the composition
of the norm, and (ii) a means of expressing their assent for it.  And
these provisions turn out to be crucial if the result ever amounts to
a consensus, because they provide two corresponding guarantees with
respect to the consensus draft, that: (i) every piece of its
contruction was laid bare to public scrutiny and exposed to all of the
editorial recommendations that an interested public could imagine; and
(ii) the end result was freely agreed to.  These guarantees, in turn,
underwrite the guidance that is provided to elected officials.  (No
such guarantees are provided if the votes cannot shift, and
consequently there is no basis for guidance.)

You were concerned about manipulation.  Do you still think the process
can be manipulated?  In the context of these scenarios, what form
would the manipulation take?


[1] http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht
[2] http://zelea.com/project/votorola/home.xht

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/