[EM] language/framing quibble

[Raph Frank]

On Sat, Sep 20, 2008 at 1:24 PM, Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke at verizon.net> wrote:
> re: (About explaining the worst case, where all except a minority
>     gets removed), "Ahh, I did with the religious minority?"
>
> As I said in my response to that explanation, the reasoning is seriously
> flawed.  It is based on the idea that an individual can 'veto' any selection
> except his own.  That's a losing proposition because it prevents the
> individual's advance.  It is not a strategy by which any ideology, however
> rabid, can gain power.

The strategy is "try to gain advancement and if that fails, then veto".

The principle is that if you can't advance (best case scenario), then
just make sure nobody else advances (2nd best scenario).

In 1/3 of cases, you get your best case, and in the other 2/3, you get
the 2nd best case.

The main counter is that a larger group do the same thing.  If 2-3
groups try it, then the largest group will gain control of all the
triads first.

Reasonable people who try to pick the best person will be at a disadvantage.

> re: (with regard to a zealot), "He says nothing about his veto
>    plan, and then at the end if he can't get through he vetoes."
>
> That is roughly equivalent to a suicide bomber.  Fortunately for all of us,
> such people are but an infinitesimal portion of our society (although they
> do damage in excess of their number.)

Well, it would be more like being told "Your mission is to get
selected, if you fail, then take out as many others as you can".

> Note that the process prevents the zealot from affecting more than two
> people.  The effect, for them, is bad, but they have two things in their
> favor:  They have an opportunity to convert the zealot to a different view
> and they have the knowledge that elections are a repetitive process.
>  They'll have another chance.

I doubt you could convert a zealot by a 20 min conversation.  However,
perhaps less committed members of the minority.

> That depends on his talent for obfuscation and deceit and the perceptiveness
> of his peers.  We currently endure a system that elevates unscrupulous
> people by design.  They are masters of deceit and obfuscation.  Were they
> subjected to the critical examination proposed in Practical Democracy, very
> few would attain public office.  As I said in the outline (and to Kristofer
> Munsterhjelm, the other day):



> re: "It would depend on how the voting works."
>
> That will be an implementation matter.  In my opinion, the three people in a
> triad, after due deliberation, will either be able to say 'We've agreed on a
> candidate' or 'We cannot agree on a candidate'.  I'm not sure more should be
> required.

Well, the strategy I suggested requires a person to be able to try to
win, and then if that fails, he vetoes.  It also requires that he
doesn't have to tip his hand early.

> re: "You could assume that a person from a religious group was
>     going to be a zealot."
>
> One should not assume anything.  That is particularly true when the process
> provides an opportunity to examine the person and determine the extent of
> their zealotry.

.. or just assume that they are planning to betray you on the next stage.

Actually, another option would be that the person's voting history is
made known to the other 2 members.

> re: "The point was that the number of triads that end up in a
>     stalemate would increase as the number of rounds pass."
>
> This is a good thought.  The circumstances set up interesting dynamics.
>  Since those who advance will be people with a strong desire for public
> office, they're not going to yield easily.  Yet, those unable to attribute
> value to others will not make good representatives.  We can anticipate
> considerable tension in the later triads, and that gives the participants an
> opportunity to gauge the others' grace under fire. That's a significant
> benefit of the method.

Alternatively, if might mean that the final council ends up with quite
a large range of sizes.

> re: "What about rescrambling them.  Triads that fail to reach a
>     consensus are reformed.  Each round might consist of 2-3
>     sub-rounds."
>
> That's a possibility.  My initial reaction was unfavorable, but after
> thinking more about it, it may be a reasonable adaptation.  It introduces
> scheduling problems, but if the stalemate problem turns out to be greater
> than I anticipate, the schedules can be reworked.

In effect, each round would become 3 rounds.  This requires that they
be made 3 times shorter or the whole process takes longer.

Perhaps a system could be set up so that the stalemates from round one
are held at the same time as round 2.