[EM] language/framing quibble

[Raph Frank]

On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 9:32 PM, Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke at verizon.net> wrote:
> re: "If there is a group that is always part of the minority, then that
> leads to resentment."
>
> The fact that a group exists does not entitle it to recognition or
> empowerment.  If an idea lacks the intrinsic merit to gain broad acceptance,
> it is not entitled to representation.  Those who would blow up the Statue of
> Liberty will (I hope) always be a minority.  If they resent their lack of
> majority, it is incumbent on them to present the rationale for their point
> of view in a manner that gains adherents.

I meant that each person would sometimes be on the majority side and
sometimes on the minority side.  They might have one idea that is only
supported by 5% of the rest of the people.  However, ideally, they
should have some other ideas that they are part of the majority on.

The key point is not to view 'the majority' as a fixed group of
people.  It should be different for different choices.

However, what can sometimes happen is that a group/party has 60% of
the vote and then they always vote as a bloc.  If you happen to be an
outsider who is part of the 40% who are not part of the group, then
you have almost no power.  This can happen if the country is split
along strict ethnic lines.

The is obviously bad for the 40% group.  However, it is also bad for
some members of the 60% group.

Assume there were 100 legislators and they are trying to decide on a
policy that harms the 40% group.

Assume that there is a PR legislature that is reasonably
representative of the population.

10 of 60 want a very harsh rule
30 of 60 want a medium harsh rule
20 of 60 want a moderate rule

20 of 40 want a moderate rule
20 of 40 want a lax rule

The median result is the moderate rule.  This is arguably the most
democratic result.

However, the group of 60 make a decision among themselves.  The median
in that group is the medium harsh rule.

The bloc then votes as a unit and the medium harsh rule is carried.

The 20 of 60 who want the moderate rule would have been better off
breaking ranks and then they would have obtained their preferred rule.

With a PR legislature, at least that is possible and acts as a balance
against party power (somewhat).  The party can't do anything to crazy.

If it was a single seat legislature, then likely the 60% group would
have obtained most of the seats.  Also, the party's selection process
would have ensured that the candidates proposed are politically
'reliable' and thus would hold near the median views of the party.

This means that when the issues comes to vote 70%+ of the legislators
could support the medium harsh rule.

In effect, it locks in the majority of the majority problem associated
with parties.

PR *combined* with the ability for members to break ranks is key to
preventing a majority of a majority from holding power.

 'Pork' is another way for ensuring party loyalty.  If a legislator
breaks ranks, he is punished by reduced pork for his district.

In ethnically divided countries, maintaining party loyalty can be
based on branding those who break ranks traitors to their ethnic
group.

> The proponents of ideas must be afforded the greatest possible opportunity
> to convince their peers of the rectitude of their point of view but the
> conviction must come, not from deception and sloganeering, but from careful
> analysis and deliberation.

Well, it is hard to come up with a way to prevent that.  Any law can
also be used by the powerful to suppress dissent.

Adb's proxy ideas might help as they are based on forming trust links.

> re: "The question is how best to decide how to vote."
>
> I disagree.  The question is how we, the people, can select who and what we
> vote for.

I was summarising what was said in your reference.  He was outlining
two models of how people should pick who they want to represent them.

Do you examine all the candidates carefully and pick one who is
trustworthy and then pay little attention to what he does, or do you
pick someone less carefully and monitor him closely and then kick him
out at the next election if necessary.

> re: "... it might not end up giving everyone equal power, but at least it
> allows the groups to negotiate, rather than excluding certain groups from
> being part of the discussions."
>
> This appears to make the groups more important than the people.  They're
> not.

Groups are just groups of people, they derive their value from the
people who they represent.

Also, by having some kind of structure, it allows discussions occur
more efficiently.  If 100 legislators had to discuss everything one on
one with all the others, then they wouldn't be able to function.

What needs to be guarded against is that the parties get to much power
(balancing the costs against the benefits).  I think making it
reasonably easy for parties to form and having a system which doesn't
discriminate against independents helps a lot with that.

If the parties accumulate to much power, then other parties will form
and/or their members will leave and become independents.

In Ireland, it happens reasonably often that a TD leaves him party
because they do something that negatively affects his constituency.
That person often (if he had a reasonable complaint) ends up getting
re-elected as he is seen as standing up for his constituency.

Also PR-STV means that there are no safe seats, politicians have to
work hard to maintain their popularity.

> re: "Candidate selection is certainly important.  Control of the selection
> process is similar to control of the districting process, it gives alot of
> power."
>
> Precisely.  And that power is used to the detriment of the humans amongst
> us.  Diluting it will not eradicate it.

However, it will make things better, it is the whole perfection being
the enemy of the good issue.

A voting system that gives less of an advantage to incumbents is an
improvement, even if incumbents still have some power.  Similarly, a
system that weakens parties centralised power is an improvement.