[EM] NPV vs Condorcet
Raph Frank
raphfrk at gmail.com
Wed Oct 22 09:31:52 PDT 2008
Another option would be something proportional completion of the ballots/
If the votes are
A: 50
B: 30
C: 20
Assume, B is preferred to C by 3/5 (30/(20+30)) of the A voters
30: A>B>C
20: A>C>B
Assume, A preferred to C by 5/7 (50/(50+20))of B supporters
21: B>A>C
9: B>C>A
Assume, B preferred to A by 3/8 (30/(50+30)) of C supporters
12: C>A>B
8: C>B>A
This gives the right proportions of first choice votes. Ofc, it
assumes that second choices follow the first choices, and I have no
idea what the strategic incentives are.
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