[EM] Buying Votes

[Greg Nisbet]

It's more damaging. A precondition for this sort of behavior is
verifiability. If a politician knew who voted for him and could reward
them, then you would see more policies like that. It happens in real
life. Congressional voting records are public. If it weren't so,
lobbyists wouldn't try.

You are also correct. Individually I do not have to give up much in
order to get money. With everyone thinking this way, the policy would
probably pass.

On Tue, Oct 21, 2008 at 5:18 PM, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> wrote:
> I think the issue is that the probability of your voting mattering is low.
>
> Let's say there is a vote on the motion:
>
> "Take $50 from everyone and give it to X"
>
> Presumably, you wouldn't support that vote.
>
> Now, what if X offered you $20 to vote for it?  The odds of your vote
> mattering is very low  (esp if there are lots of voters), so you might
> as well take the $20.
>
> p = odds that your vote swings it
>
> Gain of to voting: p*$50 (i.e. your vote defeats the motion)
> Gain of selling your vote: $30
>
> The effect is that you will vote for a motion that isn't in your best interests.
>
> This is why vote buying is much worse than a politician promising to
> do something if elected.
>
> Gain of supporting him: p*(benefit of his policy)
> Gain of not supporting him: -p*(cost of his policy)
>
> Thus both the gain and the loss are multiplied by p, so it doesn't
> favour one or the other.
>