[EM] About Condorcet//Approval

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Diego,

--- En date de : Sam 18.10.08, Diego Santos <diego.renato at gmail.com> a écrit :
> Compromising is almost unnecessary in River, Schulze or
> Ranked Pairs, but
> these methods are vulnerable to burying. And still if a
> sincere Condorcet
> winner exists, these methods have a possibility to elect a
> Condorcet loser,
> because only rankings don't provide enough information
> to find the sincere
> winner in all situations.
> 
> I don't have a proof, but I think that if a sincere
> Condorcet winner exists,
> Smith//approval is the only method  resistant to both
> compromising and
> burying strategies. This property is valid in all
> 3-candidate scenarios.
> 
> Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current
> favorite election
> method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need complex
> algorithms to find a
> winner.

Actually, Condorcet//Approval has worse favorite betrayal incentive
than Schulze(wv), probably due to the fact that the method of determining
the winner changes completely when you move from a state of having a
CW to one where there is no CW.

But I do think Condorcet//Approval has less burial incentive, as I have
argued in the past. (But only if you can't rank among disapproved 
candidates. Otherwise Condorcet//Approval is not too good here.)

Also, my Improved Condorcet Approval method, does not have favorite
betrayal incentive. However, it's not as nice to explain, and it doesn't
completely satisfy Condorcet.

Kevin Venzke

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