[EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Greg,

--- En date de : Mer 15.10.08, Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com> a écrit :
> On the topic of whether there is a method that
> satisfies both
> Condorcet and FBC.

There is not. I believe I have demonstrated this in the past, by modifying
a Woodall proof that shows Condorcet to be incompatible with LNHarm.

> http://osdir.com/ml/politics.election-methods/2002-11/msg00020.html
> claims
> that any majority method will violate FBC.

Note the term *strong* FBC. When FBC is mentioned usually only the weak
form is discussed because the strong form is almost impossible to satisfy.

> Think of it this
> way, any
> majority method without equal rankings will always
> encourage betrayal so
> that a compromise candidate will get the majoirty thereby
> sparing you
> potenial loss.

Yes.

> Anything with equal rankings cannot be a
> majority method b/c
> simultaneous majorities will form and only one will win,
> hence allowing a
> candidate with a "majority" to in fact lose.

This is avoided by defining the majority criterion to refer to strict
first preferences.

Kevin Venzke