[EM] Range vs Condorcet Overview (JH)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jobst,

--- En date de : Mar 14.10.08, Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de> a écrit :
> De: Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de>
> Objet: Re: [EM] Range vs Condorcet Overview
> À: election-methods at electorama.com, stepjak at yahoo.fr
> Date: Mardi 14 Octobre 2008, 4h06
> Dear Kevin,
> 
> your wrote:
> > The problem is that if you do not guarantee the
> majority that they will
> > get their favorite if they vote sincerely, then they
> will stop telling
> > you who their compromise choices are.
> 
> No. In D2MAC there is no such guarantee (since it is not
> majoritarian) and this fact is the *very* reason that under
> D2MAC majorities *will* tell you what their compromise is
> (if it's a good compromise) since that is the only way
> to get the compromise elected instead of ending up with a
> random ballot lottery! No majoritarian method will elect the
> compromise in the simple 55/45-example I posted several
> times, only non-majoritarian methods succeed here.

I don't mean to discuss methods with a strong random component.

While it is true that no majoritarian method will elect the compromise
when there is a majority favorite, I think it is reasonable to claim
that (all things being equal, if that is possible) the majoritarian
method will elect a compromise more often in the absence of a majority
solidly committed to a single candidate, than the method which is not
majoritarian. I am assuming voters are strategic.

Kevin Venzke