[EM] Fixing Range Voting

Peter Barath peb at freemail.hu
Wed Oct 15 10:59:46 PDT 2008


>Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy
>problem with Range Voting.
>
>The strategy problem:
>You shouldn't cast a ballot with your honest ratings, you should
>maximize them along Approval strategy lines.
>
>It also fixes the counting problem of how if someone does cast votes
>throughout the range, they might have done better in the end by
>different values.
>
>The method I call "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR):
>1. Collect ratings ballots
>2. Normalize each ballot so that each has an equal magnitude
>3. Sum up normalized ballots
>4. If there are more than two choices, drop the one with the
> smallest sum. If there are two choices remaining, one is the
> winner. 5. Re-normalize from original ballot values but as if
> dropped choices weren't there
>6. Go to 3
>
>
>I think it gets very near to a utilitarian ideal solution (
> http://bolson.org/voting/twographs.html ) and encourages people to
> vote honestly and uses those honest votes to the best possible
> effect.

I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.

Let my "honest" rangings be:

100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
20 percent for the frontrunner Cinderella
0 percent for the other frontrunner Ugly Duckling

I think I would vote: 100 Robin Hood;  99 Cinderella;  0 Ugly Duckling

If I'm really sure that the race decides between Cinderella and
Ugly Duckling, why care too much for poor Robin Hood?

And what, if I'm not really sure, because that's the situation which
multi-candidate voting is really about?

If I lower Cinderella's 99 to her honest 20, I make Robin Hood a
little bit more hopeful not to drop first. But more hopeful against
whom? Cinderella, of course, because I didn't change Robin and Ugly's
obvious rangings. So I made more probable a situation in which more
than 50 percent is the probability that the worst candidate wins.
This is a doubtful advantage.

On the other side, there is the effect that by rising Cinderella's
points from the honest 20 to 99 I made more probable the similarly
unlikely but positively desirable effect of Ugly dropping first
instead of her.

So, which does have more weigh? The doubtful little hope for
Robin Hood, or the clear little hope against Ugly Duckling?
I think the latter. Maybe at some point, let's say Cinderella's
5 percent, I like Robin so much more that I chose the first one.

In that case I probably would vote 100-1-0

These voting are not the "honest" although by one percent "honer"
than the simple Approval voting.

But I would be open for persuasion.

Peter Barath

____________________________________________________________________
Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól.
Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon!



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list