[EM] Fixing Range Voting

Greg Nisbet gregory.nisbet at gmail.com
Tue Oct 14 18:12:34 PDT 2008


Instant Range-off Voting is an interesting idea. I thought about it once a
while ago too. I didn't renormalize the ballots though, I just set the
co-highest to 100 and the co-lowest to 0 for each ballot as a sanitation
measure. I eventually abadoned it due to nonmonotonicity, but I think the
discussion is a valid one.

There are some problems with Range Voting, and perhaps tweaking it or adding
some new features will fix them, perhaps not.

Most of the problems seem to involve voters being coerced into making
extreme ballots for fear of being outcompeted by strategic rivals. Assuming
people will be honest out of charity is naive. Some of them will, perhaps
many of them will, but unscrupulous individuals could manipulate an election
if there were enough of them. So, in the spirit of idiotproofing voting,
let's discuss Range Voting spinoffs.

so for there is:

IRNR (Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings)

Cardinal Condorcet http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.htm

Various semi-proposed tweaking of Range Voting to include an elect majority
winner first or elect CW first clause.

All of these have the same goal and that goal is very simple. To either
encourage honest ratings or force more explicit ratings.

We walk a fine line here. If we flat out enforce normalized distribution, we
get Borda... A method so dismal, so appaling, so monumentally bad that it
may even be worse than FPTP.

If you were to make more score diverse ballots count more, it would suffer
from the DH3 pathology unless it exactly counteracted the weight of voting
honestly.

That being said, I think the most promising area of development here is
based around the concept of a "conditional vote" that came up a few threads
ago. The idea here being that individual ballots should "react" to a
particular candidate being kicked out of the hopeful group or something like
that.

Anyway, if anyone has any idea for multiwinner ranked/rated methods, those
are always appreciated for the study. IRNR STV looks interesting...
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