[EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- En date de : Sam 11.10.08, Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com> a écrit :
> De: Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com>
> Objet: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)
> À: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Samedi 11 Octobre 2008, 2h01
> Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
> I would like to end the truce.
> 
> I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they
> suggest something
> reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.

I suggest Condorcet//Approval with ranking among disapproved candidates
disallowed. Though apparently you are adamant about Clone-Winner
compliance.

(I also suggest my FBC tweak of this method, but then we have exited 100%
Condorcet compliance.)

> Property Related:
> favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
> Implications:
> 1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate
> your favorite
> candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy
> favorite betrayal is an
> obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of
> its glaring flaws (clone dependence *cough*)

MMPO fails clone independence rarely; the difficulty with it is its 
potential to give absurd results failing Woodall's Plurality criterion
(is how I would describe it).

> 2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region
> into two
> constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner?

I would say it doesn't matter. I'd also say that in reality, Range isn't
better, even if technically it doesn't seem to have this problem. So 
it's purely a theoretical concern.

> Condorcet methods
> are not additive, this calls into question the actual
> meaning of being
> elected by a Condorcet method.

It would, if one did not know what the meaning is. Of course the CW is
not selected on some additive reasoning.

> answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:
> 1) Range voting isn't a majority method.
> answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose
> to exercise it.

The reason this is not a satisfying answer is that when a method is a
"majority method" this means that the majority does not have to get
together before the election, identify themselves as being a majority,
and settle on a singular goal.

Otherwise almost every method is a "majority method" in your sense.
Plurality is one too.

> concession: it is true that Condorcet methods solve the
> Burr Dilemma fairly
> well because parties can simultaneously compete for
> majorities and swap
> second place votes. Range Voting can at best allow voters
> to differentiate
> between better and worse candidates by one point. So
> Range's ability to
> emulate this behavior is competitive.

That is a charitable description of Range's capability here, since
with good strategy the differentiation between any two candidates is
either zero or the entirety of the range.

Really though, I do not think Condorcet is too great in this respect.

> Understandability:
> 
> Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this)

Jobst criticizes that the numbers are meaningless. I would not criticize
this, except that it does not even seem to be possible to use strategy
to come up with a practical meaning of the intermediate ratings.

I could imagine someone perhaps complaining that the meaning of rankings
is not clear. (Perhaps they believe real preference rankings are not always
transitive.) But when you know what the rankings are supposed to do and
when and how to use them effectively under whatever method, you can still
figure out the practical meaning of a ranking, even if it does not mirror
your real and complete sentiments.

With Range this seems lacking.

> Bayesian Regret:
> 
> Range Voting (same comment)

This is trivial to dispute unless you claim that everybody is voting
sincerely under Range. Or, you claim that Warren's simulations do not
have all the limitations that they actually do. In these cases, no, that
cannot be disputed, that Range reigns supreme.

> Ballot expressiveness:

Pure expressiveness is useless. What should be compared instead is the
degree of expression possible after rational strategy is employed.

> Bottom line:
> 
> Range: You can express apathy, but you take your life in
> your hands.

On the contrary, you take your life in your hands when you do not
use the min/max ratings. That is why I prefer Approval: Why invite the
voter to take their life in their hands when it is totally unnecessary?

>  If I overlooked something or made an error, please tell
> me; I'm just a high
> school student.

I wonder if the CRV is your introduction to voting systems? I am a little
curious where the Range advocates come from.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr