[EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Greg,

> Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
> I would like to end the truce.

That won't work I guess. Using the term "better" alone is a major flaw of many discussions here. Obviously, it all depends on what goals a method is expected to achieve.

> I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest 
> something reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.

As you might guess, I appreciate this, of course :-)

> Property Related:
> favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
> Implications:
> 1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your 
> favorite candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite 
> betrayal is an obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of 
> its glaring flaws (clone dependence *cough*)
> 2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two 
> constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet 
> methods are not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning 
> of being elected by a Condorcet method.

No, it calls into question the actual meaning of being elected in a region. The misunderstanding arises only when you interpret the election of A in a region as meaning that A is "best" in some sense. But Condorcet methods are based on a different logic than measuring "goodness" of candidates. They have more to do with stability, for example: Electing a candidate other than the Condorcet Winner always faces immediate opposition by some majority who prefers the Condorcet Winner. So, if you consider majorities significant (which you seem to judging from your reasoning further down), you should consequently not accept different winner when a Condorcet Winner is available.

> answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:
> 1) Range voting isn't a majority method.
> answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise 
> it. 

I greatly appreciate your making this clear! Warren has often argued that Range is *not* really majoritarian when I pointed this out. The main point is of course the question of whether one assumes intelligent voters who vote strategically or dumb voters who vote "honestly" against their own interest (whatever "honestly" means with a ratings-based method - more on this below). When we assume intelligent voters, Range is clearly a majoritarian method.

That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people (the "demos" in greek). Often, about 60% of the people can consistently impose their will on the other 40% without the latter being given any means at all by the majoritarian method to influence the decision. Of course, this is a problem of most popular election methods, but that does not mean the problem cannot be solved. Democratic decisions are possible but not with majoritarian methods.

> Voter Experience:
> 
> Range Voting (based on the existence of Amazon product ratings, 
> youtube video ratings, hotornot.com, the number of movies rated out 
> of stars.) I cannot find a single instance of Condorcet methods 
> besides elections in various open source communities. It doesn't 
> qualify as mainstream.

That may be right but is irrelevant for the question of what is a good method and what is not.

> Understandability:
> 
> Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this)

Then let me challenge you right away: I don't understand at all what those numbers a range-ballot asks me for are supposed to mean. They are not explained but instead it is simply assumed naively that each voter will be able to assign meaningful numbers to options. Some even suggest that voters should apply their "gut feelings" to derive the numbers - as if voting were about diffuse emotions and not hard facts. In real world situations it is difficult enough to decide whether I *prefer* A to B or B to A or neither to the other. Often enough it turns out that A is preferable in some aspects and B is preferable in other aspects. Suggesting to weigh the aspects first is of no help since it lifts the problem of coming up with meaningful numbers only to a higher, more abstract level. Also, Range advocates tell us that the numbers are not simply supposed to be monetary values but rather such things as degrees of "utility" or perhaps "happiness". Simple question: Can you enumerate y
 our happiness with, say, having saved a species from extinction? And even if some people can, it is obviously not justified to simply assume that every voter should be able to do such magic without at least providing some serious scientific evidence for such a bold claim.

Yours,
Jobst