[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Oct 5, 2008, at 8:21 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:

> Jonathan
>
> Not a bad solution at all Jonathan, although there is a lack of
> transparency to any electronic count for the average citizen

That's true enough, though it's also true that the average citizen  
isn't going to recount (or even observe a recount of) a plurality  
election. I've participated in one myself, and it requires true  
dedication.


> - and
> IRV/STV counting methods are virtually impossible to audit with
> anything less than a 100% manual count and are virtually impossible to
> accurately manually count in some election contests.

That's the point of my suggestion, though: it's easy to audit, either  
100% or by sampling, the ballot file, and a concerned voter could  
surely find an independent counter that she trusted, even if she  
couldn't manage the count on her own.

The system could easily provide a set of test files with known results  
such that a prospective counter could have reasonable assurance that  
their counting software was counting correctly. Of course, in order to  
challenge a count, the challenger's counting software would have to be  
open-source, so it could be independently confirmed that the  
discrepancy wasn't due to a bug.

>
>
> But I like this solution for any alternative voting method that does
> not have all the other severe flaws of the IRV/STV method.

Well, we disagree on the merits of STV, but my suggestion is really  
method-independent.

>
>
> Ballot level auditing does have certain challenges as you mention.
>
> Kathy
>
> On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:08 PM, Jonathan Lundell  
> <jlundell at pobox.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> BTW, it seems to me that there's a relatively straightforward  
>> solution in
>> principle to the problem of computerized vote counting, based on  
>> the use of
>> separate data-entry and counting processes. Let voters vote on  
>> paper, either
>> by hand or with an electronic marking machine, enter the ballot data,
>> perhaps by scanning, in such a way that the resulting ballot data  
>> can be
>> verified by hand against the paper ballots, and permit counting by  
>> multiple
>> independent counting programs.
>>
>> There are nontrivial details to be resolved, in particular ballot  
>> secrecy
>> and the resolution of conflicting results, but it seems to me that  
>> it's a
>> fairly contained set of problems.
>>
>
>
>
> -- 
>
> Kathy Dopp