[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[Dave Ketchum]

On Mon, 6 Oct 2008 08:30:29 -0700 AllAbout Voting wrote:
> Kathy Dopp wrote:
> 
>>It seems to me that most of the persons on this list would rather have
>>votes fraudulently counted using some alternative voting scheme that
>>requires an unverifiable unauditable electronic voting system, than
>>accurately counted using the plurality election method.
> 
> Some have that attitude.  I'm not one of them.  I think that plurality is
> a lousy voting method *and* that our current voting system is wide-open
> to fraud.  In my view both can and should be addressed.  For the most
> part the means of addressing them are orthogonal.
> 
> That said, voting methods that are not countable in precincts (eg. IRV)
> pose a very large challenge to providing for election integrity.  This,
> in addition to other significant faults of IRV, causes me to oppose IRV..
> 
> I notice that some supporters of Condorcet voting (Dave Ketchum in
> particular) directly argue that improving the plurality system should be
> done even if it sacrifices election integrity.

Ouch - anyway I am for integrity and am certain it can be done without 
Plurality - though i am with you as to opposing IRV,
> 
> So I will ask a pair of constructive questions:
> 1. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with precinct level optical scan
> systems?  (which many election integrity advocates consider to be
> pretty good)

A Plurality ballot needs only one indicator as to which candidate is voted 
for, plus candidate name for a write-in.

A Condorcet ballot has the same need for ability to handle a write-in name, 
plus a rank number for each of the one or more candidates voted for.

DESIRABLE for the precinct to fill in and forward the NxN array as a 
summary of all the ballots counted.  If anything is forwarded as to 
individual ballots, this is for verification purposes.

> 2. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with end-to-end verifiable
> election integrity systems such as punchscan, 3-ballot, etc...?

My initial reaction is that the information for verification exists, but a 
systems designed for other purposes might need modification to fit 
Condorcet needs.

Note that any ballot acceptable by IRV rules fits in a subset of what 
Condorcet permits.  The counting being different makes Condorcet countable 
in precincts.
> 
> I suspect that the answers to both questions is 'yes' which would make
> Ketchum's dangerous arguments that software can be blindly trusted irrelevant.

That DOES NOT sound like a true description of what I have said,

Anyway, there certainly should be better verification of the software used 
than some vendors have offered.

Further, I am sure optical scan involves computer programs with the same 
questions as to trusting as for others.
> 
> -Greg Wolfe
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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