[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Oct 6, 2008, at 5:42 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:

> Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>
> "BTW, it seems to me that there's a relatively straightforward  
> solution
> in principle to the problem of computerized vote counting, based on
> the use of separate data-entry and counting processes. Let voters vote
> on paper, either by hand or with an electronic marking machine, enter
> the ballot data, perhaps by scanning, in such a way that the resulting
> ballot data can be verified by hand against the paper ballots, and
> permit counting by multiple independent counting programs."
>
> That is exactly what Burlington (VT) and San Francisco (CA) do.  
> Optical
> scan ballots are used, and the voter rankings are tallied by an  
> official
> open-source program, but can also be tallied (and has been tallied) by
> other programs, because all of the ballot images are posted on the
> Internet.  A key element, however is a hand-audit of a random sample  
> of
> machines to assure (to a reasonable degree of confidence) that the
> computer record for the ballots matches the paper record. This  
> redundant
> record is what makes these ranked-ballot elections significantly MORE
> secure than traditional hand-count elections (were some ballots  
> stolen,
> added, re-marked to spoil, etc.?) and more secure than all electronic
> elections (was there a bribed programmer who inserted a virus?)

California has a pretty good statewide requirement for a random (by  
precinct IIRC) recount.

However, I'm mildly skeptical on the above, both that SF uses open- 
source counting software and that the ballots are available online.  
Can you provide URLs for both? I'd love to do some counting myself.

Putting hand-marked ballot images online raises vote-buying issues.