[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Kathy Dopp wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 3:51 PM, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
> 
>>> In fact some computer scientists just recently mathematically PROVED
>>> that it is impossible to even verify that the certified software is
>>> actually running on a voting machine.
>> Tell us more, a bit more convincingly as to fact behind this opinion -
>> assuming proper defenses.
> 
> Here is the info. I have not read the proof yet myself:
> 
> "In 'An Undetectable Computer Virus,' David Chess and Steven White show
> that you can always create a vote changing program (called virus
> there) that no "verification software" can ever detect.

Without having read the paper, I suspect this is a reduction to the 
Halting problem. Of interest regarding my earlier idea of 
special-purpose machines is that most voting systems don't need full 
Turing capability to find out who the winner is, so one may be able to 
make a program (or chip) for counting votes that can be proven not to 
have modifications (subject to the assumptions of the surrounding, 
less-than-Turing, framework).

> It seems to me that most of the persons on this list would rather have
> votes fraudulently counted using some alternative voting scheme that
> requires an unverifiable unauditable electronic voting system, than
> accurately counted using the plurality election method.
> 
> Curious.

Say that the losses due to fraud is p. Also say that the losses due to 
using Plurality is q. Then, if there is no fraud at all under Plurality, 
and a lot of fraud under the better method, and p < q, then switching to 
an alternative voting scheme, even if that would lead to fraud, is an 
improvement. This is a quick and dirty argument (because surely there 
can be some fraud under Plurality, and no voting method would work if 
all the ballots have been subject to fraud, i.e the entire input is 
garbage), but it should get the point across.