[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[James Gilmour]

Just for the record  -

> Raph Frank > Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2008 11:27 PM
> > On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 12:00 PM, James Gilmour 
> > Here in Scotland there is a somewhat "hidden" debate that must be had.  
> > STV-PR was introduced for local government elections in 2007.  The 
> > counting rules adopted (Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method for 
> > consequential transfers) make electronic counting almost obligatory.  
> > (Manual counting to WIGM rules is possible, but long and tedious 
> > because so many ballot papers have to be sorted and counted again and 
> > again.)  So we used scanners, OCR conversion and e-counting.
> 
> That is similar to Abd's ballot imaging suggestion.
> 
> I assume that the images used for the OCR aren't made 
> available to the public?

Correct  -  the images were not made available.  Those that were subject to adjudication by a Returning Officer were seen, by all
who want to look, on a computer screen, large or small, during the count.  The images (and the adjudication decisions on them) are
stored on the hard drives used at each of the 32 counting centres.  These disks have to be kept securely for four years  -  no
access to anyone except with a Court Order.  All the ballot papers and all the other paper records from the elections and counts had
to be destroyed securely one year after polling day.

 
> > The Scottish Government is promoting further use of
> > STV-PR for various directly elected bodies.  This is raising issues 
> > about the long-term provision of the equipment necessary for 
> > e-processing of the ballot papers for all these different public 
> > elections and about the software that will be used for scanning, OCR 
> > and counting.
> 
> This can be solved by just publishing the ballot images.  
> This way everyone can work out their own result.

Yes, BUT adjudication on "doubtful" images can be critical.  So if you had access to the images and ran them through your own OCR
software you may well come up with different vote files.  Interestingly, in one pre-election "validation test" of the electronic
processing versus manual counting for the STV-PR elections, the results were different  -  due only to a difference in the
adjudication decision the ROs made when they look at the on-screen image and when they looked at the actual ballot paper.


> > Concerns about "black box" processing have been somewhat muted so far, 
> > but there have been calls for all blank ballot papers to be subject to 
> > individual adjudication by the Returning Officer under scrutiny of the 
> > candidates and their agents. This is an example of the ridiculous 
> > double-standards that are being applied to e-processing, because 
> > straightforward blank ballot papers would never be subject to 
> > Returning Officer adjudication in a manual count.
> 
> A blank ballot is one that has no writing on it, or one that is not used?

"Blank ballot paper" here means one that came out of a sealed ballot box at the counting centre and had no vote recorded on it.
Ballot papers that are not issued to electors at a polling place (= precinct) are sealed up at the polling place by the presiding
officer at the close of the poll.  When each ballot box is opened, there is a reconciliation of:  1. the numbers of ballot papers in
the box; 2. the numbers of ballot papers not used; and 3. the numbers of ballot papers issued and replaced as "spoilt"  -  these
should add to the total number of ballot papers issued for that polling station within that polling place.  (There can be two or
more polling stations within one polling place - in Scotland.)

Those who want access to real ballot data from real elections (STV-PR) will be interested to know that the full ballot data for each
of the 21 wards (= local government electoral districts) within the City of Glasgow were published on the City Council's website at
the conclusion of the count on 4 May 2007.  No other Returning Officer has published the full ballot data in this way.  The file of
preference profiles was one of the automatic outputs from the eSTV counting program.  It is arguable that in publishing the full
ballot data, the Glasgow Returning Officer broke the current law, but no-one has demanded that he remove the data, and the Scottish
Government is proposing to make this a requirement for all local government elections.  This MAY be applied retrospectively so that
we get all the data from the 2007 STV-PR elections.  Meanwhile, the Glasgow data are invaluable resources for research, as they show
what real voters do in real elections.

James



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