[EM] Voting Theory and Populism

[Diego Santos]

2008/10/19 Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com>

> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> > Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the method was to simply
> > have a runoff between the top two approved candidates.
> >
> > In the example mentioned, it didn't seem to me that anybody had majority
> > approval, in which case it isn't clear who would win a runoff. Maybe I
> > was misreading the scores as actual ballots.
>
> I meant that under strategy, the effect of clones should be reduced.
> If A is cloned, then the B + C supporters can react by only approving
> B, so B gets through.  When there is only one A, then there is less
> incentive for C's supporters to support B.
>
> Ofc, if there is ideal strategy, then there is no need for the run
> off, as the voters will just pick the condorcet winner directly.


For this reason, the runoff is conducted if a majority consent (approval)
doesn't exist. The reason of runoff is to reach a majority winner if many
people vote in plurality style, like TRS.

I didn't use rankings because IAR was intended for people with low knowledge
in underdeveloped countries. When ballot complexity is not a problem, I
prefer ranked or rated methods.

>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>



-- 
________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
Mestrando em Ciência da Computação
COPIN - UFCG
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20081019/bc321b6f/attachment-0001.htm>