[EM] Voting Theory and Populism

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Raph,

--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> a écrit :
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke
> <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> > Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the
> method was to simply
> > have a runoff between the top two approved candidates.
> >
> > In the example mentioned, it didn't seem to me
> that anybody had majority
> > approval, in which case it isn't clear who would
> win a runoff. Maybe I
> > was misreading the scores as actual ballots.
> 
> I meant that under strategy, the effect of clones should be
> reduced.
> If A is cloned, then the B + C supporters can react by only
> approving
> B, so B gets through.  When there is only one A, then there
> is less
> incentive for C's supporters to support B.

Hmm, I'm confused and need to see an actual profile I think.

Sounds something like:
40 A
30 B
30 C>B

I think each candidate should run with a clone. At least, the one
expected to be in the lead, always should.

When that's expected, the C voters have to approve B no matter what.
Unless there's some chance C could get more approval than A, in which
case C should also have a clone.

Kevin Venzke

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