[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-elmet at broadpark.no
Wed Nov 26 09:53:54 PST 2008


Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Kristofer,
> 
> --- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> a écrit :
>> If IRV does elect the true Condorcet winner in all
>> realistic elections (as opposed to the CW according to
>> strategic ballots), and the Australian two-party (two and a
>> third?) dominance arises from IRV, then that means that any
>> Condorcet single-round single winner method will lead to two
>> party dominance. That would be unfortunate. Of course, if it
>> is the truth, no matter how unfortunate it is, it'll
>> still be the truth; and in that case we should focus on
>> multiwinner elections and PR instead.
> 
> Might depend on what your goals are. If you want multiple parties in
> order to represent more interests, best go to PR in the first place.
> I want it to be possible to have multiple viable "parties" in order
> to make it more likely that the median voter can get what he actually
> wants.
> 
> For the latter, I don't think it's clear that if Condorcet can't succeed,
> nothing can.

I suppose what I want is a combination of this. The voter should have 
what he wants (which is to say, the method should make it more likely 
that the median voter can get what he wants), but if there is no 
selection among alternatives, that can't happen. In other words, if 
there is a two-party state and the parties don't care about your issues, 
you're out of luck; and if they say they care about your issues, only to 
turn around once elected, you have little chance to do anything. A 
duopoly is bad whether it's a political or economic duopoly.

So I want the people to be able to get what they want, but also the 
method to support the circumstances that ensure that will be true in the 
future as well.



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