[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> If we must have a
> single ballot, and a single winner, period, Range Voting is
> actually a trick: it is the only relatively objective method
> of assessing the expected voter satisfaction with an
> outcome, turned into an election method. It's ideal
> because it's designed that way. (The only fly in the
> ointment is the charges about strategic voting, but I've
> been arguing that this is based on a total misconception of
> what we are doing when we vote.)

I don't understand how you reconcile the two ideas here. Range is
"objective" and "ideal because it's designed that way" based on the
idea that voters have internal utilities and, if they vote them exactly,
under Range voting, the best candidate according to overall utility
will be elected every time.

At the same time you want to defend Range against the charge of 
susceptibility to strategic voting, essentially by denying that the
Range voter is supposed to be mapping his true, absolute preferences
onto the ratings.

If the idea of a sincere set of ratings irrespective of context is "a
total misconception of what we are doing when we vote," then what useful
theory is Range based on? What makes it "objective" and "ideal" if not
what I stated above?

I also wonder, what, theoretically, does it look like when Range fails
and gives a poor result. Is such a thing allowed?

Kevin Venzke