[EM] Three rounds

Raph Frank raphfrk at gmail.com
Fri Nov 14 02:54:52 PST 2008


On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 8:56 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:
> This does mean that a party can crowd out its competitors by running two
> candidates of the exact same position. On the other hand, that may be what
> you want, since one could reason that this brings a competition of quality
> to the center position, where the two best centrists would be picked for the
> runoff. That doesn't give the people much to discuss between the first and
> second rounds, though, since the candidates' position would be identical.

Their positions would likely be similar but not identical, especially
in a multi dimensional political space.

The campaign would come down to questions of capability as a
representative and small policy differences.

One possible issue would be a small turnout at the second round.  This
might encourage them to appeal to extremists.


> First round, use a method like Schulze to get a
> social ordering. Pick the first and second place candidates on that social
> ordering for the second round.

Right, that is what I was thinking.  With any condorcet method, you
could just say pick the winner and then pick the winner excluding the
first winner, but I think most condorcet completion methods generate a
complete ordering.

Another option would be to pick the 2 most approved candidates for the
2nd round.
> It's a reasonable first guess to imagine using a PR method, but it doesn't
> work. See above.

Yeah, we agree.

> That's what D'Hondt without lists does; or rather, it deweights those
> preferences that are lower than the winner of the first round, since the
> voters already "got what they wanted" on a higher preference. (Of course, I
> would use Sainte-Laguë instead of D'Hondt, but that's an implementation
> detail.)

Interesting.

The process is that you vote for your top choice that is still in the
running but it is deweighted by the number of higher choices who have
already been elected?

A vote of A>B>C would vote for C if A and B were elected at a weight
of 1/5 strength (assuming Sainte-Lague)?

How are eliminations handled?



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