[EM] Three rounds

[Juho Laatu]

--- On Fri, 14/11/08, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> wrote:

> From: Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
> Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Friday, 14 November, 2008, 12:26 AM
> On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 10:11 PM, Juho Laatu
> <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> > This party list based method actually allowed the
> party supporters not to be rock solid supporters of the
> party. Those 7 A2>B>A1 voters were able to indicate
> that they preferred B to A1. And their favourite still won.
> 
> Hmm, it is IRV except but it uses a different elimination
> order.  A
> candidate from the smallest party is eliminated first (and
> presumably
> the candidate from the party with the fewest votes if the
> party has
> more than 1 vote).
> 
> I assume that the party totals are re-calculated after each
> elimination?  That means that the largest party doesn't
> automatically
> win (as their candidates would be eliminated last)

Yes, that was my assumption in this method. After C was eliminated those votes supported B. But that meant only 45 votes for B, which was this time not enough against the 55 votes of the A party.

The A party candidates were just like one combined "A1+A2" candidate in a regular IRV election until that candidate won. After that there was a second race between the candidates of the A party.

This approach clearly encourages formation of parties or other groupings/coalitions. If all candidates are either under a left wing or right wing coalition the bigger of those coalitions will win. (Hierarchies of groupings/parties/coalitions are possible too.)

This approach also encourages parties to nominate more than one candidate, as in the example where the A party won thanks to nominating a good compromise candidate (A2, that had less first place popularity than A1) that appealed also to the A2>B>A1 voters that would have voted for B (making B the winner) if A2 would not have been available.

Juho