[EM] Three rounds

[Dave Ketchum]

Not clear to me what you meant.

While ballots are almost identical, such that Condorcet can accept what 
voters have done by IRV rules, their processing is entirely different.

IRV is interested in first choices.  If it decides that A is a loser it 
must go back to the ballots that ranked A top and reclassify them by next 
rank of each.

Condorcet is interested in which candidate is best liked.  For this it 
needs an NxN array summing all the ballots.  If it is convenient to count 
the ballots in multiple locations this is fine - create an NxN array at 
each location and sum them together in one final location for analysis.

DWK

On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 06:39:53 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
> Yes, IRV is a good example. Most Condorcet methods do the comparisons/evaluation just once (when all the candidates are in the same situation).
> 
> Juho
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --- On Tue, 11/11/08, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>>From: Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>>Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
>>To: juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
>>Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 2:47 AM
> 
> 
>>If I understand you 'sequential elimination' is IRV
>>and not Condorcet.
>>
>>DWK
>>
>>On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 00:01:36 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
>>
>>>The sequential elimination processes tends to
>>
>>introduce additional problems. Most Condorcet methods
>>don't have this problem.
>>
>>>Condorcet may have some other problems that the
>>
>>sequential elimination based approach may avoid, but
>>especially in large public elections with independent voter
>>decision making and without too accurate knowledge about the
>>behaviour of other voters the performance of Condorcet
>>methods is very good.
>>
>>>(Just checking how one could eliminate some of the
>>
>>problems of sequential elimination (e.g. by using approval
>>and avoid losing the "eliminated" candidates).)
>>
>>>Juho
>>>
>>>
>>>--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Dave Ketchum
>>
>><davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>>From: Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>>>>Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
>>>>To: juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
>>>>Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>>>Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 8:10 PM
>>>>How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a
>>>
>>competitor?
>>
>>>>It:
>>>>    Normally is defined as not doing runoffs.
>>>>    Has no problem with voters offering whatever
>>>
>>quantity
>>
>>>>of ranks they choose, including doing bullet
>>>
>>voting.
>>
>>>>DWK
>>>>
>>>>On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu
>>>
>>wrote:
>>
>>>>>FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the
>>>>
>>>>presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct
>>>
>>two
>>
>>>>round method has been used. Before that (in most
>>>
>>elections)
>>
>>>>the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who
>>>
>>then
>>
>>>>voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last
>>>
>>round).
>>
>>>>>Reasons behind moving to the direct two round
>>>>
>>system
>>
>>>>included assumed general popularity of a direct
>>>
>>election,
>>
>>>>some problems with heavy trading and planning of
>>>
>>votes by
>>
>>>>the electors, possibility of black horses and other
>>>
>>voting
>>
>>>>patterns that are not based on the citizens'
>>>
>>votes.
>>
>>>>Maybe three rounds / three election days in a
>>>
>>direct
>>
>>>>election would have been too expensive and too
>>>
>>tiring.
>>
>>>>>- - - - -
>>>>>
>>>>>One somewhat related method:
>>>>>
>>>>>I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV
>>>>
>>one would
>>
>>>>not totally eliminate the least popular (first
>>>
>>place)
>>
>>>>candidates but would use some softer means and
>>>
>>would allow
>>
>>>>the "eliminated" candidates to win later
>>>
>>if they
>>
>>>>turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after
>>>
>>their
>>
>>>>first preference candidates have lost all chances
>>>
>>to win).
>>
>>>>>One could e.g. force supporters of the
>>>>
>>>>"eliminated" candidates to approve more
>>>
>>than one
>>
>>>>candidate (at least one of the
>>>
>>"remaining"
>>
>>>>candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their
>>>
>>second
>>
>>>>preference). On possible way to terminate the
>>>
>>algorithm
>>
>>>>would be to stop when someone has reached >50%
>>>
>>approval
>>
>>>>level.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Also in "non-instant" runoffs one
>>>>
>>could e.g.
>>
>>>>force the voters to approve at least one on the
>>>>"remaining" candidates. (One could
>>>
>>eliminate more
>>
>>>>than one candidate at different rounds.)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Juho
-- 
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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