[EM] Three rounds

[Dave Ketchum]

If I understand you 'sequential elimination' is IRV and not Condorcet.

DWK

On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 00:01:36 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
> The sequential elimination processes tends to introduce additional problems. Most Condorcet methods don't have this problem.
> 
> Condorcet may have some other problems that the sequential elimination based approach may avoid, but especially in large public elections with independent voter decision making and without too accurate knowledge about the behaviour of other voters the performance of Condorcet methods is very good.
> 
> (Just checking how one could eliminate some of the problems of sequential elimination (e.g. by using approval and avoid losing the "eliminated" candidates).)
> 
> Juho
> 
> 
> --- On Mon, 10/11/08, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>>From: Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>>Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
>>To: juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
>>Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 8:10 PM
>>How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a competitor?
>> It:
>>     Normally is defined as not doing runoffs.
>>     Has no problem with voters offering whatever quantity
>>of ranks they choose, including doing bullet voting.
>>
>>DWK
>>
>>On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
>>
>>>FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the
>>
>>presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct two
>>round method has been used. Before that (in most elections)
>>the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who then
>>voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last round).
>>
>>>Reasons behind moving to the direct two round system
>>
>>included assumed general popularity of a direct election,
>>some problems with heavy trading and planning of votes by
>>the electors, possibility of black horses and other voting
>>patterns that are not based on the citizens' votes.
>>Maybe three rounds / three election days in a direct
>>election would have been too expensive and too tiring.
>>
>>>- - - - -
>>>
>>>One somewhat related method:
>>>
>>>I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV one would
>>
>>not totally eliminate the least popular (first place)
>>candidates but would use some softer means and would allow
>>the "eliminated" candidates to win later if they
>>turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after their
>>first preference candidates have lost all chances to win).
>>
>>>One could e.g. force supporters of the
>>
>>"eliminated" candidates to approve more than one
>>candidate (at least one of the "remaining"
>>candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second
>>preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm
>>would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval
>>level.
>>
>>>Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g.
>>
>>force the voters to approve at least one on the
>>"remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more
>>than one candidate at different rounds.)
>>
>>>Juho
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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