[EM] (no subject)

[Dave Ketchum]

I have not inspected the affidavits for completeness or correctness.  I am 
only comparing the methods.

Assuming IRV's rules result in declaring A or B winner, it would not care 
or look at what this voter may have said about C or D.

Condorcet looks at all that the voters say, and uses all of that in 
deciding on a winner - as to C and D the possibilities are:
      C>D
      D>C
      C=D = the voter indicates equal liking by giving them the same rank 
or by ranking neither.

DWK

On Sun, 9 Nov 2008 18:54:27 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
> Dave Ketchum > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2008 6:02 PM
> 
>>James seems to be stretching his interpretation a bit far.
>>
>>Agreed that, while the voter can choose to rank all 
>>candidates, the voter is permitted to omit those least desired.
>>
>>In Condorcet every ballot is counted.  For each the counter considers EVERY 
>>pair of candidates, such as A and B.  If the voter has indicated preferring 
>>A>B, that is recorded toward A winning; likewise for B>A.
>>
>>As to IRV, while using the same ballot, it only looks at enough to satisfy 
>>it purpose - which DOES NOT INCLUDE knowing whether the voters like A 
>>better than B.
> 
> 
> I am not stretching my interpretation too far.
> 
> In elections to be counted by IRV or Condorcet rules voters will not mark preferences for candidates among whom they have no
> preferences.  Thus in a four-candidate election, a ballot paper marked "A, B" indicates that this voter prefers "A" over "B" and
> prefers both "A" and "B" over both "C" and "D", and it tells the Returning Officer that this voter has no preference between "C" and
> "D".  In contrast, a ballot paper marked "A, B, C, D" has given the Returning Officer information about all possible preference
> comparisons.
> 
> It is clear from the affidavits that ONE of the objections to IRV is that the ballot paper marked "A, B" will be treated differently
> from the ballot paper marked "A, B, C, D", and hence the voting system will treat the two respective voters differently (and to such
> an extent as to be "unconstitutional").
> 
> In a Condorcet count these two ballot papers (and hence the respective voters) would also be treated differently, because the voter
> who marked the "A, B" ballot paper could not contribute a vote to the "C, D" pair-wise contest that is an essential part of
> determining which candidate should be elected.
> 
> My question was simply that if the effect of THIS difference in an IRV count is sufficient to make IRV counting "unconstitutional",
> why would the effect of THIS difference in a Condorcet count not be sufficient to make Condorcet counting also "unconstitutional"?
> I could easily see how, on THIS ground, IRV counting and Condorcet counting could both be considered "constitutional" or could both
> be considered "unconstitutional", but I have some difficulty is seeing how, on THIS ground, one could be considered "constitutional"
> and the other "unconstitutional".
> 
> James Gilmour
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>On Sun, 9 Nov 2008 16:20:10 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
>>
>>>Kathy Dopp  > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2008 2:17 AM
>>>
>>>
>>>>Your statement oversimplifies and ignores details/differences
>>>>between IRV and Condorcet.  IRV proponents may pretend not to 
>>>>know that Condorcet methods do not exhibit most of the flaws 
>>>>of IRV counting methods. For example, Condorcet, to my 
>>>>knowledge treats all voters ballots equally, considers all 
>>>>choices on all ballots, 
>>>
>>>
>>>If I have understood the various submissions correctly, the 
>>
>>principal 
>>
>>>objection to IRV on THIS ground, is that the ballot papers 
>>
>>of voters 
>>
>>>who express different numbers of preferences are thereby treated 
>>>differently, and in such a way and to such an extent that these 
>>>differences should render the IRV voting system "unconstitutional".
>>>
>>>It is correct that Condorcet counting considers all the preferences 
>>>marked on the ballot papers, in a sequence of pair-wise contests.  
>>>However, Condorcet counting has no option but to treat differently the 
>>>ballot papers of voters who have expressed different numbers of 
>>>preferences, because such voters will be excluded from some of the 
>>>pair-wise counts.
>>>
>>>If this difference in the treatment of ballot papers with different 
>>>numbers of preferences would be a "fatal" flaw in IRV, would it not 
>>>also be a "fatal" flaw in Condorcet counting, and indeed in any other 
>>>voting system where voters may express different numbers of 
>>>preferences?
>>>
>>>James Gilmour
-- 
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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