[EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad Thing Worse)

[Dave Ketchum]

On Fri, 07 Nov 2008 09:58:30 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
>> With the EC it seems standard to do Plurality - a method with 
>> weaknesses most of us in EM recognize.
>>
>> Let's do a Constitutional amendment to move up.
>>
>> I propose Condorcet.  One advantage is that states could move up to 
>> use it as soon as ready.  States, and even districts within states, 
>> could remain with Plurality until able to move up - with their votes 
>> counted as if they did bullet voting with Condorcet.  Approval voting 
>> would be permitted the same way.
>>      To clarify, the US would be a single district, while vote counts 
>> could be published for states and other contained districts, as might 
>> be useful.
> 
> 
> I think an NPV-style gradual change would have a greater chance of 
> succeeding than would a constitutional amendment. The constitutional 
> amendment requires a supermajority, and would thus be blocked by the 
> very same small states that benefit from the current Electoral College.

An NPV style change MIGHT have a greater chance than an amendment but:
      It would be incomplete.
      Small states could resist for the same reason.

Note that small states could retain their advantage with an amendment -- as 
I proposed.  What might all states compromise on?
> 
> As for the system of such a compact, we've discussed that earlier. I 
> think the idea of basing it on a Condorcet matrix would be a good one. 
> That is, states produce their own Condorcet matrices, and then these are 
> weighted and added together to produce a national Condorcet matrix, 
> which is run through an agreed-upon Condorcet method.

How do we tolerate either weight or not weight without formal agreement 
(amendment)?
> 
> If all states use Plurality, well, the results are as in Plurality. If 
> some use Condorcet, those have an advantage, and if some want to use 
> cardinal weighted pairwise, they can do so. Yet it's technically 
> possible to use any method that produces a social ordering (by 
> submitting, if there are n voters and the social ordering is A>B>C, the 
> Condorcet matrix corresponding to "n: A>B>C"). While imperfect, and 
> possibly worse than Plurality-to-Condorcet or simple Condorcet matrix 
> addition, the option would be there, and would be better than nothing.

Actually each state does only the first step of Condorcet - the NxN array:
      If a state does Condorcet, that is exact.
      If a state does Plurality, conversion as if voters did bullet voting 
in Condorcet is exact.
      If a state does something else, it has to be their responsibility to 
produce the NxN array.

States have differing collections of candidates:
      In theory, could demand there be a single national list.  More 
practical to permit present nomination process, in case states desire such.
      Thus states should be required to prepare their NxN arrays in a 
manner that permits exact merging with other NxN arrays, without having to 
know what candidates may be in the other arrays.
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.