[EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonicvoting methods

[Stéphane Rouillon]

The spoiler effect is a special case of non-monotonicity.

A general definition of a monotonic method is:
no voter or group of voter could harm a candidate by expressing its full 
preference toward any higher preferred candidate.

While you restrict monotonicity definition to:
no voter or group of voter could harm its favourite by expressing its full 
preference.

It is your choice. You chose to disregard the fact that winners, while the 
voter expresses or not its full preferences, could both not be the favourite 
of the voters.

I do not understand why you want to consider the spoiler effect as a 
different problem. As soon any voter would learn that its first choice has 
no chance of winning, its second choice would become its new first choice, 
the spoiler effect leading again to your personal definition of the 
monotonic dilemma...

Historically we gave it another name, but it is still a perticular case of 
the same problem...

Sorry i am not impressed enough by your defense to use any capital letter 
word....

Stéph.
PS: I do understand there are problems auditing preferential ballot systems. 
However I am still convinced STV or STV-PR is the best system among those 
actually used in the world. Why not stick to paper ballot with STV? I think 
it would remove the auditing problems you hate. Irish people have been using 
this system since 1929, no computers existing at the time. Even with an 
explosion of candidates, it can be done using a pen, without centralizing 
all the data, with simply enough communications between the election center 
and the poll stations...  All you need is to make sure that the election 
result is the good one. Instead with computers you have to make sure that 
the result for any election is the right one: a very complex job indeed...

>From: "Kathy Dopp" <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>
>Reply-To: kathy.dopp at gmail.com
>To: "Stéphane Rouillon" <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca>
>CC: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending 
>non-Monotonicvoting methods
>Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 21:26:06 -0700
>
>Stephane,
>
>You are confusing the spoiler effect with monotonicity.
>
>Plurality voting is ALWAYS monotonic.
>
>Neither IRV or plurality solve the spoiler problem.
>
>Both are susceptible to strategizing. I don't know any voting method
>that is not.
>
>Does anyone have anything helpful to add?
>
>Kathy
>
>On Thu, Nov 6, 2008 at 9:03 PM, Stéphane Rouillon
><stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca> wrote:
> > Again Kathy, it depends how you define monotonicity.
> >
> > With FPTP, you can easily let your third choice win by voting for your 
>first
> > choice
> > while you could have got your second choice elected by voting for him.
> > But as you only want to consider monotonicity in regard to your first
> > choice, you argue that FPTP is monotonic, which is right using that
> > definition.
> >
> > Stephane Rouillon
> >