[EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonicvoting methods

Kathy Dopp kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Thu Nov 6 20:26:06 PST 2008


Stephane,

You are confusing the spoiler effect with monotonicity.

Plurality voting is ALWAYS monotonic.

Neither IRV or plurality solve the spoiler problem.

Both are susceptible to strategizing. I don't know any voting method
that is not.

Does anyone have anything helpful to add?

Kathy

On Thu, Nov 6, 2008 at 9:03 PM, Stéphane Rouillon
<stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca> wrote:
> Again Kathy, it depends how you define monotonicity.
>
> With FPTP, you can easily let your third choice win by voting for your first
> choice
> while you could have got your second choice elected by voting for him.
> But as you only want to consider monotonicity in regard to your first
> choice, you argue that FPTP is monotonic, which is right using that
> definition.
>
> Stephane Rouillon
>



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