[EM] language/framing quibble

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Fred Gohlke wrote:
> The proposed electoral method uses computers to maintain a database of 
> the electorate, generate random groupings, and record the selections 
> made at each level,  This makes the process inherently bi-directional. 
> Each elected official sits atop a pyramid of known electors, so 
> questions on specific issues can easily be transmitted directly to and 
> from the electors for the guidance or instruction of the official.
> 
> How extensively this capability is used depends on those who implement 
> and administer the process.  For example, the town council, state 
> legislature, and/or national congress can decree that certain questions 
> must be referred to the people who selected the representatives serving 
> in the body.  In such an event, the representative would instruct the 
> database administrator to send the question down through the chain that 
> elected him.

So, in essence, the pyramid structure remains even after selection? This 
sounds a bit like having councils all the way down to adjust the higher 
levels, except that the councils don't meet in the traditional fashion, 
but the messages just propagate when required. That should provide some 
correction and accountability, but I'll try to see how it may err.

You'll lose the corruption resistance by surprise property. This would 
mean that external parties could try to corrupt those at the next 
highest level in order to overturn the highest; that is, if the next to 
highest council has formal powers. If it doesn't, there's nothing to 
say, in the worst case, that the highest level will listen to them, so 
let's say they have.

One possible way of handling this would be to make the lower levels 
advisory. A lower level could send a message upwards; at higher levels 
short of the ones actually making up the legislature (or other body), 
these messages would be considered important, but from lower ones, they 
would be more like letters to congressmen. Also, lower levels may 
initiate referenda (initiative or recall) as if a majority of those 
below them in the pyramid had requested it; so if a direct democracy law 
requires ten thousand people to agree (submit signatures) for the 
referendum to be held, a person with twenty thousand below him (majority 
being 50%+1) could request it on his own. That would provide a 
countering force which would not be absolute; the higher level 
"delegates" would have to pay attention to what those lower to them have 
to say, yet those lower than them cannot be corrupted   "at the blink of 
an eye". It's still not perfect, since higher-but-not-highest pyramid 
members may swamp the system, or those who were not selected may decide 
to make matters hard for those who were, just on principle. Still, 
perhaps those problems can be fixed. For PR, instead of 50%+1, it would 
be proportional to those who did elect the person in question, or 
rather, the strength of his support.
Perhaps it could be balanced further by that if a person at level n 
wants to ask the people of something, he must get a majority at levels 
below him to agree, or a majority of the two levels below, or something 
like that. That would work as a filter to prevent the kind of swamping 
or flooding I've considered above.


Another potential problem may lie in that the pyramid structure is 
static between elections, which means that as opinions shift among the 
members that were not elected, they may have inappropriate power. That's 
also a problem with representative democracy (parliamentary or 
presidential) but those have only one level, whereas this has more than one.

> This capability should be used with caution, however.  Some of the 
> matters public officials must decide do not admit of simple answers. 
> Some may be unpopular or painful to the citizenry ... restraining the 
> cancerous growth that currently dominates (and threatens) our existence 
> will not be accomplished easily.  We want to elect people with the 
> courage and wisdom to improve our society, not destroy it.  We can not 
> expect to be happy with all their decisions.  We've taken pains to 
> select people of integrity and judgment, we should not restrain them 
> unnecessarily.
> 
> The matter of how and when this option should be used raises several 
> questions.  For example, it leaves open the matters of how the questions 
> should be framed and evaluation of the responses.  The answers to 
> questions that elicit 'yes/no' responses can be influenced by the 
> phrasing of the question.  On the other hand, anything more complex than 
> a 'yes/no' response requires interpretation which could be difficult, 
> since clarity of written expression does not seem to be an inherent 
> human trait.
> 
> We must also consider how responses are to be transmitted upward.  My 
> initial idea was that the people would give their response to the person 
> they selected from their group, and that person would pass it upward.  I 
> anticipate, though, an objection that this method would preserve the 
> biases that influenced the selection of the official in the first place. 
>  I think that's a valid guess, but I suspect the matters to be resolved 
> this way are more apt to involve nuances than significant changes of 
> attitude.  The method refines the public attitudes.  It should not 
> encourage abrupt changes.  If the selection process is repeated 
> frequently, and, as you suggested, each election only replaces a portion 
> of the elected body, it will be responsive to current circumstances and 
> the need for 'public questions' will be reduced.

If you have computers, you could do this in a manner similar to delegate 
cascade. Anybody can submit a message. The message is given weight 
according to (strength gained from those below the sender in the 
pyramid)/(population size). The computer lists messages sorted by 
weight. PR methods could have some form of successive downweighting so 
that say, a very persistent person in the middle of the pyramid doesn't 
crowd out others at his level.

This might work on all stages of the hidden structure, as well. Consider 
a number of "tiny voters" (low level in the pyramid). Individually, they 
have little power; but they could find a compromise and tell a common 
higher level member/voter of that message, which he could then transmit 
further at greater strength. Because of the randomization (at least on 
lower levels), this shouldn't lead to party formation.

What way could such a system err? It might if the delegates are not 
neutral enough, in which case they may let people they know have undue 
influence (who you know matters more than what you know). But the 
dynamics become hard to predict.

> In addition to the possibility of questions mandated by the public body, 
> the system will support voluntary requests for guidance by elected 
> officials.  In my view, this is the preferred option.  We elect people 
> to perform a function and we should trust them to carry it out. However, 
> partisans, in fulfilling their role, will raise questions and publicize 
> alternatives that should inspire a wise public official to seek the 
> guidance of his constituents.  This method provides the means for doing so.

What do you mean by requests for guidance?