[Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge+new method AMP

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

Jobst wrote:
> Dear Raphfrk,?
> it did not think through all you wrote yet, but one point troubles me:?
> > Also, it is majority compliant.  If a majority support a candidate first 
> choice (i.e. first choice and nominate him), then he cannot lose.?
> If that is true, your method cannot be a solution to the given problem, 
since any majoritarian method will elect A in the situation I described 
-- remember that voters are strategic!?
> Yours, Jobst 


 
Right, under the assumption of perfect strategy.? However, only a small number of voters need to nominate C as compromise for C to win.

Are you assuming that the 51% block of voters knows that they have the majority ?

In the case you give

51: A>C>B
49: B>C>A

It seems to me that the voters, will not be sure which of the main candidates have a chance.

Assuming the odds are 50/50 and considering a voter in the 51 block and how they cast their nominate vote:

Nominate C
This will either have no effect or cause C to win.

A->C shift: -48
B->C shift: +52

expected utility: +2

Nominate A or B
This will either have no effect or shift away from C

C->A shift: +48

C->B shift: -52

expected utility: -2

Thus, it is worth it for A and B supporters to nominate C instead of A.

Only, 3% of them need to actually do it to elect C.

Btw, I think your original proposal is pretty cool too.? I wonder what the effects of putting a threshold would be on the strategic effects.

For example, if a candidate represents more than 90% of the balls in the urn, they are declared the winner without drawing any.



Raphfrk
--------------------
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"

www.wikocracy.com

 


 


________________________________________________________________________
AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20080504/11a5cec0/attachment-0003.htm>