[Election-Methods] Comparing multi-winner methods

[Stéphane Rouillon]

Hi Kevin,

the satisfaction criteria I proposed to evaluate multi-winner methods is 
independant of PR measurement.
It is a parallel criteria. For example two different electoral methods 
could elect the same
proportion of the political parties candidates (30 Cons and 70 Lib for 
example),
but not the same persons. Thus proportional analysis would produce the same
PR measure but satisfaction analysis could differ in result.

I do not need to know the method. The goal is even to be able to
evaluate a method without knowing wich one it is.
All I need is a sincere set of the electorate will (it covers either 
preference or approbation
using this word) and the outcome. To be precise I need to know the 
candidate set
among which each elector can choose one or several representative (it 
can be applied to single-winner method too).

No I don't think average rating will always be optimal. I'll try to 
build a counter-example.

Yes I can build cases where pushing PR to optimality would decrease 
satisfaction measurement.

SPPA optimizes PR, and after, using this optimal seat distribution as a 
constraint, optimizes
satisfaction by choosing which candidate receives seats for each 
political party.
At the time, I was calling this maximizing individual approbation.

Stéphane

Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> Hi Stéphane,
>
> --- Stéphane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca> a écrit :
>   
>> Hello Kevin,
>>
>> these ratios are guesses I have for real elections.
>> But I am fed up with guesses so the goal is to build an objective method 
>> able to
>> determine for a perticular set (method, ballots expressing sincere 
>> preferences, outcome)
>> of one electoral data, the most satisfying method in the eye of all
>> voters.
>>     
>
> But if you assume sincerity, won't you end up finding "average rating" to
> be the best method? Or are you mainly concerned with PR here?
>
> If the latter, it seems interesting to me to ask whether "the most
> satisfying method in the eye of all voters" might actually be incompatible
> with proportionality?
>
> Kevin Venzke
>
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