[Election-Methods] Comparing multi-winner methods

[Stéphane Rouillon]

Hello Kevin,

these ratios are guesses I have for real elections.
But I am fed up with guesses so the goal is to build an objective method 
able to
determine for a perticular set (method, ballots expressing sincere 
preferences, outcome)
of one electoral data, the most satisfying method in the eye of all voters.

Stéphane

Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> Hi Stéphane,
>
> --- Stéphane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca> a écrit :
>   
>> Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which 
>> of IRV and FTP
>> produces the best outcome. Using enough election data, one could even 
>> measure how often IRV may
>> elect the candidate not favored by most voters. My humble estimation is 
>> rarely (1/50 times).
>> In comparison I estimate FPTP outcomes to be deficient (1/5 times) and 
>> condorcet methods (1/200 times).
>> I qualify a method to be deficient when another outcome would produce a 
>> better global satisfaction.
>>     
>
> To do this you would have to be clear and consistent with your
> assumptions... Is "global satisfaction" the total utility (on some scale)
> of the winner? When you guess that IRV fails by this standard 1/50 times,
> are you considering real life elections, or random ones? If random then how
> many candidates and is there any underlying policy space? etc.
>
> Given real life elections I guess 1/50 may be accurate for IRV, but I don't
> feel this tells the whole story. Strategic nomination and voting
> incentives, as well as incentives created by institutions other than the
> voting rule itself, would not seem to be considered at all by this measure.
>
> Given random elections with even 3 candidates and the ability to truncate,
> I guess IRV is much, much worse than 1/50.
>
> Kevin Venzke
>
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