[Election-Methods] IRV ballot is at least as fair as FPTP ballot

Sat May 3 16:51:54 PDT 2008

Of course,

I supposed that the information provided from ballots was sincere....
And I supposed that the outcome that would have been obtained
if all voters had voted like a particular voter would give 100%
satisfaction to this particular voter.

Stéphane

Kathy Dopp a écrit :
> On Sat, May 3, 2008 at 10:26 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
> <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca> wrote:
>   
>>  Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which of
>> IRV and FTP
>>     
>
> This statement does not make logical sense because measuring
> "feelings" like "satisfaction" is not an objective measure.
>
> For example just because most voters have confidence that their
> invisible electronic ballot are cast and counted accurately, does not
> make it so.
>
>   
>>  produces the best outcome. Using enough election data, one could even
>> measure how often IRV may
>>  elect the candidate not favored by most voters.
>>     
>
> This statement also does not make logical sense for  at least two reasons:
>
> 1.  because voting behavior and strategy changes depending on the
> counting methodology, so you can not learn anything about whether how
> often "the elected candidate would be the one most favored by voters"
> from examining other voting schemes, and
>
> 2. unless you can mind read and interview every voter and know what
> strategy they used when voting, and also unless you can review every
> ballot, not just the summary data you may be able to obtain from some
> election officials, you may not be able to accurately judge "most
> favored by voters" from looking at election data.
>
> I'm going to ignore the rest of your comments since your two opening
> comments are logically invalid.
>
> Kathy
>
>   
>> My humble estimation is
>> rarely (1/50 times).
>>  In comparison I estimate FPTP outcomes to be deficient (1/5 times) and
>> condorcet methods (1/200 times).
>>  I qualify a method to be deficient when another outcome would produce a
>> better global satisfaction.
>>
>>  Stéphane
>>
>>  Kathy Dopp a écrit :
>>
>>
>>  Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2007 19:33:27 +0100 (CET)
>> From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
>> Subject: [Election-Methods] RE : Re: IRV ballot is at least as fair as
>>  FPTP ballot
>>
>>
>>
>>  Yes some voters have second-choice considered but they are all still
>> treated equally.
>>
>>  So, you "define" equal as your ballot's first and second choices
>> count, but someone else's first and second choices do not.
>>
>> I and many others may disagree with your definition of "equal"
>> treatment and I hope that the courts do too since IRV may often elect
>> the candidate not favored by most voters.
>>
>>
>>
>>  But it does this according to what it believes each voter wants. If your
>>
>>  Well I don't want some voters' second choices given consideration but
>> not all voters' second choices given consideration. Will it take what
>> I believe into consideration? No.
>>
>>
>>
>>  first preference wins the election, then you don't want your second
>> preference to be counted. If your first preference is a very weak
>> candidate, then you want him to be eliminated so that your second
>> preference can be counted.
>>
>>
>> One problem is that my second choice candidate may be eliminated in
>> the first round and my first choice candidate not have success either
>> - despite the fact that my second choice candidate is the most popular
>> among all voters.
>>
>> For instance, this example, which is one of countably infinite
>> examples where IRV elects the candidate not supported by most voters:
>>
>>  Republican Libertarian Progressive Democrat
>> 1st choice 4 3 3 2
>> 2nd choice 1 2 1 7
>> 3rd choice 1 1 6 1
>>
>>
>> I.e. in this example with 12 voters, the Democrat loses in the first
>> round, even though the most number of persons supported the Democrat
>> overall - letting the Republican win, even though the Republican (in
>> this example) is not as widely supported as to other candidates.
>>
>> I created a list of the 12 voters and their choices in a spreadsheet.
>> I suggest you do a little experimenting on your own because I do not
>> have time to do the analysis for you because I am too busy to spend
>> my time disabusing you of a fiction you hold. I am working on other
>> more critical matters. Please do the analyses yourself with a
>> spreadsheet so you can see how trivially easy it is to make IRV put
>> the wrong candidate, not supported by most voters into office.
>>
>> For example in Florida, what if the true first choice of most
>> Democratic voters had been Nader in 2000, then IRV would have
>> immediately knocked the Democrat out of the race, enabling the
>> Republican to win. (BTW, Nader had virtually nothing to do with Gore
>> losing Florida in 2000 - there was 1. electronic fraud in one county
>> that robbed thousands of votes from Gore temporarily, 2. tons of
>> illegal undated military ballots sent into election offices during the
>> election contest and when the Dems tried to challenge the illegal
>> ballots, they were intimidated by being told they were not patriotic,
>> and 3. Katherine Harris removed thousands of legal voters off the
>> rolls primarily in Black Democratic districts. IRV would have made
>> sure that Gore didn't win, even without all those other election
>> frauds or voter disenfranchisements.
>>
>> IRV is factually just not capable of doing what it claims to be able to do.
>>
>> Kathy
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  For this reason it's not obvious which voters are put at a disadvantage.
>>
>>
>>
>>  IRV not only treats voters'
>> ballots very differently, it ensures that there are numerous ways that
>> a candidate is declared a winner who is supported by fewer voters
>> overall than a candidate who loses in the first round.
>>
>> This fact is irrefutable, obvious and simple. Just try some scenarios
>> out in any spreadsheet.
>>
>>  It is a valid criticism that IRV can elect a candidate with less "support"
>> than some other candidate.
>>
>> This makes me wonder what election methods you do like, since
>> first-preference plurality voting already has the same issue. Just because
>> the plurality ballot doesn't ask for "support" doesn't mean the concept
>> doesn't exist.
>>
>> In any case, people on this list who dislike IRV still would not want to
>> argue that it should be illegal, since this could set a precedent that
>> prevents other, arguably better methods from being adopted.
>>
>>
>>
>>  IRV would only be fair and treat all voters equally if all first AND
>> second choices of all voters were tabulated, with the second choices
>> being given some weight less than the first - ONLY then would IRV not
>> routinely allow numerous ways to declare a candidate a winner who is
>> supported by fewer voters than the candidate who loses in the first
>> round.
>>
>>  That sounds like Borda, not IRV. Borda would be terrible in public
>> elections. Maybe you would like Bucklin, in which all voters' subsequent
>> choices are added in until somebody has a majority.
>>
>> It's worth noting, about these, that an IRV advocate can argue that it is
>> unfair for a vote for a second preference to cause one's first preference
>> to fail to win.
>>
>> What do you think of top-two runoff, as in Louisiana? In the
>> three-candidate case IRV is the same method as this, except that the second
>> round is performed automatically according to the rankings.
>>
>> If my candidate is eliminated in the first round of a top-two runoff, so
>> that I am forced to vote for a different candidate in the second round, do
>> you feel I have been treated unequally?
>>
>> Alternatively, if my first choice makes it to the second round but loses,
>> have I been treated unequally because I never had a chance to vote for my
>> second preference?
>>
>> I guess one could hold such opinions, but top-two runoff is not such a rare
>> method in the world.
>>
>> Kevin Venzke
>>
>>
>>  ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>>
>>
>>
>>     
>
>
>
>   