[Election-Methods] A better IRV (was Re: Range Voting won't eliminate spoilers)

[Chris Benham]

Steve Eppley wrote  (Sun Mar 23  2008):
I've no idea what Chris meant below when he claimed plain IRV would 
provide "extra meaningful choices" compared to IRV//Withdrawal.

Steve,
I didn't claim any such thing. In reply to your statement that 

"IRV might cause polarization even worse than what we already have.."

I wrote 
Some people might think that (for many elections) providing voters with extra
meaningful choices is more important than  "reducing polarisation".

"What we already have" isn't IRV//Withdrawal.  I was addressing your apparent
suggestion that IRV might be worse than FPP.


49: A
24: B (sincere is B>C)
27: C>B


"I find Chris' "Later No Harm" example utterly uncompelling.  Candidates 
B & C are clones who appear to be nearly identical on the issues, since 
the supporters of A are indifferent between B & C.  Thus there's no 
reason to believe voters would be significantly harmed by electing B 
instead of C or C instead of B."

My example makes no mention of any "issues", nor makes any distinction 
between harm that is "significant" or not. It just demonstrates that your 
suggested withdrawal option breaks IRV's Later-no-Harm guarantee.

"Furthermore, if the supporters of A are not truly indifferent between B 
& C, they've apparently harmed themselves by (strategically?) 
truncating.  They've taken away A's ability to improve the outcome for 
them by withdrawing."

Yes, but that is irrelevant. My example says nothing about the A voters'
sincere preferences. The A candidate might have correctly predicted that
he would win the IRV election and announced in advance that he wouldn't
withdraw. Maybe the A voters have a weak preference among B and C or
maybe they are indifferent.

"Regarding Chris' "philosophical" opposition to letting candidates affect 
the outcome after the votes are cast, I'll point out that parliamentary 
systems give them much more of that sort of power.  Members of 
parliament negotiating to pick the prime minister and the rest of the 
cabinet aren't bound by preferences of the voters,..."

Members of parliament are not "candidates", they have already been elected
(to seats in parliament, purely by voters exercising their votes).

"..I must wonder if Chris' opposition to parliamentary systems 
is greater than his opposition to Withdrawal."

I didn't say that I oppose parliamentary systems, and that is a separate issue.

"Assuming Chris' opposition to Withdrawal based on his philosophical 
opposition against giving candidates any influence over the result after 
the votes are cast isn't kneejerk, he seems to believe Withdrawal 
negotiations would tend to benefit the candidates or their parties at 
the expense of the voters.  Why?"

Earlier you seem to recognize that some candidates (including some who
win) are corrupt. The scenario I gave is a recipe for corruption and/or the
appearance of corruption. Maybe A can corruptly induce C to *not* withdraw.
Maybe C is corrupt and won't withdraw without some payoff from B.

On the other hand maybe C isn't corrupt, but decides for some other reason to
not withdraw. Then C is likely to be exposed to acrimony form B>A voters and the
suspicion that C secretly took a bribe from (and/or was threatened by) A or some
powerful A supporter/s.

It is much better to leave it in the hands of the voters exercising their votes through
a neutral unbiased algorithm. 

Chris Benham




Steve Eppley wrote  (Sun Mar 23  2008):
Hi,

I've no idea what Chris meant below when he claimed plain IRV would 
provide "extra meaningful choices" compared to IRV//Withdrawal.  I 
believe he has that backward, that plain IRV deters candidates from 
competing at compromise positions by making those positions falsely 
appear relatively unpopular.

It would be nice if more IRVings would admit, as Chris seems to have 
done here, that IRV won't reduce polarization and that other methods 
would.  He might be right that "some people" won't consider polarization 
as bad as other voting method flaws, but from what I gather, most people 
do want to greatly reduce polarization.

I don't know where Chris got the idea that my preference for 
IRV//Withdrawal over plain IRV is based on a preference for criteria 
like Condorcet and Minimal Defense over Later No Harm.  Rather, I want 
to reduce spoiling, and I especially want to increase competition to be 
the "best compromise" since (1) that would reduce polarization and (2) 
it would tend to elect less corrupt winners by allowing voters to rank 
less corrupt (compromise) candidates over more corrupt (compromise) 
candidates.

I find Chris' "Later No Harm" example utterly uncompelling.  Candidates 
B & C are clones who appear to be nearly identical on the issues, since 
the supporters of A are indifferent between B & C.  Thus there's no 
reason to believe voters would be significantly harmed by electing B 
instead of C or C instead of B.

Furthermore, if the supporters of A are not truly indifferent between B 
& C, they've apparently harmed themselves by (strategically?) 
truncating.  They've taken away A's ability to improve the outcome for 
them by withdrawing. 

Finally, proper analysis of the scenario must not neglect that the 
incentives induced by Withdrawal begin to act on A, B & C long before 
election day to lead them to compete to be the best compromise. 
(Throughout their political careers, if Withdrawal or another 
compromise-promoting voting method becomes ubiquitous.)  If they are 
near each other on the issues, why should we fret over election day 
voter strategizing?

Regarding Chris' "philosophical" opposition to letting candidates affect 
the outcome after the votes are cast, I'll point out that parliamentary 
systems give them much more of that sort of power.  Members of 
parliament negotiating to pick the prime minister and the rest of the 
cabinet aren't bound by preferences of the voters, whereas with the 
Withdrawal option the only power candidates have is to step out of the 
way of their supporters' next preferred candidate.  With Withdrawal, 
they can't determine the outcome except within certain bounds set by the 
votes.  So I must wonder if Chris' opposition to parliamentary systems 
is greater than his opposition to Withdrawal.

Assuming Chris' opposition to Withdrawal based on his philosophical 
opposition against giving candidates any influence over the result after 
the votes are cast isn't kneejerk, he seems to believe Withdrawal 
negotiations would tend to benefit the candidates or their parties at 
the expense of the voters.  Why? (Philosophy is not a compelling argument.)

Regards,
Steve


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