[Election-Methods] Ballots with cycles

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Wed Mar 5 08:54:55 PST 2008


In ranking systems we think of the voter assigning a numeric rank to each 
candidate such as, for A,B, 4,5 or 4,4 or 5,4.

What are you proposing?

Remember also that in a race for governor the voting information must go 
to a central counting site.  In Condorcet, without your proposal, the 
information for each precinct can be entered in an array and forwarded, 
with the arrays summed to get total votes.

DWK

On Wed, 5 Mar 2008 07:54:12 -0500 Andrew Myers wrote:
> Suppose that in a Condorcet system, we allow people to submit a  
> ballot that has an arbitrary preference relation, so any two  
> alternative A and B can have either A<B, A=B, or A>B. There can  
> therefore be cycles in the graph of preferences, like A<B<C<A.
> 
> One reason why we might want to set up the system this way is that we  
> can protect voter privacy better by separating different preferences  
> during the tallying process.
> 
> The question is whether this creates new strategic voting  
> opportunities. I have not been able to construct a scenario where it  
> makes strategic voting more powerful.  Is this worse than burying  
> with ordinary ranked ballots?
> 
> -- Andrew
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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