[Election-Methods] Determining representativeness of multiwinner methods
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at broadpark.no
Wed Jun 25 10:49:25 PDT 2008
Terry Bouricius wrote:
> That brings me to an interesting issue, which may be off-topic for this
> list..."sortition"...the selection of a legislative body by means of
> modern sampling methods that assure a fully representative body. There is
> an interesting history of the tension between sortition on one hand and
> election on the other (Athenian democracy used both), where sortition was
> seen as the more democratic method, with election being the lesser
> (because candidates with more money or fame had such an advantage over
> average citizens). It is the old question of whether representative
> democracy should be seen as "self-governance," or "consent of the
> governed."
Possibly taking this thread even further off topic, I could mention a
hybrid I once thought of. If there's a legislature of 360 members (to
use a highly composite number), use random sampling to construct 36
groups - juries or citizens' assemblies - each of which elect ten from
their own numbers to the main assembly.
Assuming the jury voters know what they're doing, the final
representatives would have greater skills than a randomly selected
assembly, yet they would not be as prone to corruption and
"aristocratic" effects as a directly elected assembly (since nobody can
tell who'll make up the first-round juries, and thus no shadowy group
could run ads on the behalf of any of those candidates).
One disadvantage to this method is that minorities of less than a tenth
of the population won't be represented (since each jury only elects ten
members). Another is that it may be considered undemocratic since only
(36 * members of each jury) have any say in the final outcome.
The size of the assemblies, and how many they elect, could be tuned as
desired to reflect a particular position on the sortition-election spectrum.
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