[Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 10:55 AM 6/6/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
>ou might be interested to know I just learned of a paper written by 
>Professor Jane Mansbridge of the John F. Kennedy School of 
>Government at Harvard University.  It concerns candidate selection 
>and is the first work I've seen that provides an academic basis for 
>the electoral method I've outlined on this site.  If you'd like to 
>read the paper, it can be downloaded without charge from:
>
>http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010

Interesting. I want to thank Mr. Gohlke for drawing our attention to 
this paper.

Indeed, Mansbridge explores the theory of representation, 
distinguishing between the selection model and the sanctions model, 
and covering much of the territory that I covered when inventing 
FA/DP (but with her own specialization, I'm not claiming that I 
covered what she covered, only that she covered much of what I covered).

Delegable Proxy is a pure selection model of representation, but it 
also, through revocability, incorporates the sanctions model on an 
immediate basis, because the principal (which I usually call the 
"client") may at any time withdraw the proxy. That is not exactly a 
"sanction," because it does not necessarily cause the loss of an 
office (this depends on many other factors), but it has the same 
effect; the principal may hold the representative responsible for his 
or her actions, and may respond by either continuing to maintain the 
representation, or by withdrawing it and, perhaps, assigning it to 
someone else.

Mansbridge is writing mostly about the existing system and how some 
representatives are selected for general compatibility with those who 
vote with them ("selections") whereas others are considered to be 
motivated by a desire to keep office, so they will act to please 
their constituents who may otherwise "punish" them by removing them 
from office ("sanctions"). However, she notes that selection works 
best when a constituency is relatively homogeneous.

In Delegable Proxy, the constituency is defined as homogeneous by 
being the set of all those who have chosen the same proxy, i.e., who 
consider this person the best to represent them.

Mansbridge doesn't seem to be aware that representation (in a 
proportional representation assembly) through chosen proxy was first 
proposed by Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson) in 1884. He noted that, 
in an STV election, instead of vote transfers being controlled only 
by the voter's preferential ballot, voters who preferred to trust a 
single candidate could do so, and vote transfers could then be under 
the control of that candidate, "as if those votes were his own 
property." This, of course, is the same metaphor that was used when 
Warren Smith named his method, in 2004 (?) "Asset Voting." Mike 
Ossipoff and Forest Simmons had earlier called it "Candidate Proxy." 
And, unaware of all this at the time, I called it "Delegable Proxy," 
though I was considering representation only for the purpose of 
measuring consensus on a large scale.... but the core idea is the 
same in all of these: representation by chosen representatives, not 
"elected" representatives, in the sense of an oppositional election, 
with losers. Pure selection, and only the minimal sanction of 
continued voluntary maintenance of the proxy assignment, or withdrawal.

I don't see Ms. Mansbridge's work as well-related to the complex 
system of elections proposed by Mr. Gohlke, partly because his groups 
are not self-selected and not homogeneous, generally. Mansbridge is 
specifically likening selection to "Agency," which is precisely 
equivalent to the institution of the proxy. Proxies are "elected," 
technically, but the election isn't a contested one. It's unanimous.