[Election-Methods] Dopp: 3. “Encourages the use of complex voting systems and [FairVote promotes] electronic-balloting”

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

>3. Dopp: “Encourages the use of complex voting 
>systems and
 [FairVote promotes] electronic-balloting
”
>
>Most government IRV elections are in fact 
>conducted with hand-count paper ballots, 
>including national elections in Australia, 
>Ireland and Papua New Guinea. FairVote is a 
>leading advocacy organization for IRV, but it is 
>joined in supporting IRV by numerous other 
>organizations and individuals, including the 
>founders of TrueVote Maryland, and election 
>integrity leaders David Cobb and Anthony Lorenzo.
>As to FairVote, it advocates the replacement of 
>all paperless voting machines with paper-ballot 
>systems, such as optical scanners. All three of 
>the major voting machine vendors have created 
>optical scan options for ranked-choice ballots. 
>Not all of these are ideal (some, for example, 
>cannot handle more than three rankings), but 
>FairVote expects IRV elections to be 
>overwhelming run on paper ballot systems in the 
>future. FairVote advocates that all such 
>machines store a redundant electronic record of 
>each ballot, as well as a paper ballot to allow 
>for better fraud detection, and to simplify 
>ranked ballot tabulations. Rather than making 
>such elections more complicated, this would 
>simplify the process, while improving transparency and integrity.

This is a repeat of the last issue to some 
extent. Voting security experts are generally 
concerned with the increasing reliance of the 
voting systems on computers. *Computers are 
extraordinarily complex, they are the most 
complex machines and systems ever made.*  There 
are some who go so far as to advocate entirely 
manual systems of counting votes. While IRV can 
certainly be hand-counted. it's difficult to sell 
it in the U.S. for hand counting, and there are a 
number of jurisdictions which have approved IRV 
"pending implementation." And until the money 
arrives with the political will is there for 
spending it, there is no IRV. Those places have 
voting equipment that could handle other, simpler 
voting reforms, such as Approval, Bucklin Voting 
(now called Fallback Voting by Steven J. Brams), 
Borda Count, or Range Voting, and the general 
agreement among voting systems experts -- as 
distinct from "political scientists" -- is that 
these other methods are superior to IRV. Because 
the other methods simply involve counting the 
marks on the ballot, in each position, they are 
all easier to count and to audit.

Consider an IRV audit. It's not enough to look at 
the totals for each rank. One has to look at each 
round, the ballots transferred in that round, 
which means that the ballots contain pairs of 
marks, many different pairs. Suppose A is 
eliminated. On some ballots A might be in first 
position, on some in second position, on some in 
third position, and so forth. Then each of those 
ballots, where A is eliminated, there is the 
candidate in next position. The exact sequence of 
eliminations that took place in the original 
election must be followed. Compare this with just 
counting the marks in each position and adding 
them up. And FairVote activists can deny the 
complexity issue with a straight face? It's 
complex. The questions, properly, should be, "Is 
it worth it?" "Are there other possible reforms 
that might accomplish similar goals that are less 
complex or less expensive? "If we are going to 
change, shouldn't we decide on the best reform by 
careful comparison of all the options?" FairVote 
only wants us to think about IRV vs. Plurality, 
on the one hand, or IRV vs. Top-two runoff, on 
the other. And the arguments they give for the 
two situations are quite different. Against 
Plurality, they point out the spoiler effect, and 
the desirability of a majority. Since top-two 
runoff does fix the spoiler effect -- as well as 
IRV -- they talk expense, for the most part. But 
they also talk "majority," and manipulate the 
meaning of the word to make it appear that IRV 
finds majorities, when the fact is that it does not and top-two runoff does.

But we start to go too far afield. IRV is complex 
to count, far more complex than other systems.



>4. Dopp: “Confuses voters
”
>
>All the evidence shows that voters are not 
>confused by IRV. The rate of spoiled ballots did 
>not increase in any of the U.S. cities when they 
>switched to IRV. For example, Burlington (VT) 
>used IRV for the first time in a hotly contested 
>race for mayor in 2006, and among those casting 
>votes in the IRV race fully 99.9% of ballots 
>were valid, with the very highest valid ballot 
>rate in the ward in town with the highest number 
>of low-income voters. San Francisco’s rate of 
>valid ballots in the most closely contested race 
>in its first citywide election with IRV was 
>99.6%. Furthermore, exit polls have been 
>conducted in every city having an IRV election 
>for the first time in the modern era. Each 
>survey shows that voters overwhelmingly prefer 
>IRV to their old method of elections.
>
>5. Dopp: “Confusing, complex and time-consuming to implement and to count
”
>
>IRV certainly is simpler for election officials 
>and voters than conducting a whole separate 
>runoff election to find a majority winner. It is 
>more complicated to administer than a single 
>vote-for-one election, but election officials 
>have adjusted well to their new 
>responsibilities. Note that the winning 
>threshold for an IRV election, as with any 
>election, must be specified in the law.
>
>6. Dopp: “Makes post election data and exit poll 
>analysis much more difficult to perform
”
>
>To date, IRV election can make it easier to do 
>post-election and exit poll analysis. Because 
>optical scan counts with IRV require capturing 
>of ballot images, San Francisco (CA) and 
>Burlington (VT) were able to release the data 
>files showing every single ballot's set of 
>rankings – thereby allowing any voter to do a 
>recount and full analysis on their own.
>
>Exit polls can be done just as well under IRV 
>rules as vote-for-one rules. California requires 
>a manual audit in its elections, which has been 
>done without difficulty in San Francisco’s IRV 
>elections. Manual audits should be required for 
>all elections, regardless of whether IRV is used or not.
>
>7. Dopp: “Difficult and time-consuming to manually count
”
>
>Manual counts can take slightly longer than 
>vote-for-one elections, but aren't difficult, 
>unless many different races on a ballot need to 
>go to a runoff count. As cited earlier, Irish 
>election administrators can count more than a 
>million ballots by hand in hotly contested 
>presidential elections in one standard workday.
>
>8. Dopp: “Difficult and inefficient to manually audit
”
>
>  IRV can be manually audited just as well as 
> vote-for-one elections, although it does take 
> more effort (since voters must be allowed to 
> express more information on their ballot). A 
> manual audit can either be done using a random 
> sample of ballots from all jurisdictions, or a 
> random sample of ballots from a random sample 
> of voting machines, or by a complete re-tally 
> from a random sample of voting machines. A 
> complete re-tally of all ballots (a recount) 
> is, of course, possible but unnecessary unless a court recount is ordered.
>
>9. Dopp: “Could necessitate counting all 
>presidential votes in Washington, D.C.
”
>
>If the Electoral College were abolished and IRV 
>were then adopted for future national popular 
>vote elections for president, there would need 
>to be national coordination of the tally in 
>order to know which candidates got the fewest 
>votes nationwide and needed to be eliminated – 
>just as in Ireland. But the actual counting of 
>ballots does not need to be federalized any more 
>than if IRV was not used, and could be conducted 
>by counties, states or whatever level is easiest 
>and most secure for that jurisdiction. Note that 
>voters certainly would be pleased to have a 
>majority winner in elections for our highest office.
>
>10. Dopp: “IRV entrenches the two-major-political party system 
”
>
>IRV neither "entrenches" nor "overthrows" the 
>two-party system. It simply ensures no candidate 
>wins over majority opposition. If a minor party 
>has the support to earn a majority of vote, it 
>can win in an IRV election. If not, it will not win.
>
>IRV is a winner-take-all method, like plurality 
>voting and two-round runoffs. However, IRV 
>allows independents and candidates with minor 
>parties to run without being labeled as 
>spoilers. This may reveal a higher level of 
>support for these parties, and if these parties 
>are attractive to voters, their support may grow.
>Relating to multi-party representation, any 
>winner-take-all, single seat election method 
>tends towards two dominant parties, at least in 
>any given geographic area. To allow for multiple 
>parties to regularly win office, jurisdictions 
>should adopt a form of proportional 
>representation in which candidates will be able 
>to win office with less than 50% of the vote.
>
>Note that Australia’s IRV elections are often 
>cited as an example of two-party domination. But 
>while the two major parties (one of which is 
>divided into two parties, with one party running 
>in one particular region of the country) 
>dominant representation, the minor parties 
>contest elections very vigorously, with an 
>average of seven candidates contesting house 
>elections in 2007. That year the Green Party did 
>not win any seats in house elections, but it ran 
>candidates in every district and earned 8% of 
>the national vote. It naturally would prefer a 
>proportional representation system, but supports 
>IRV over alternate winner-take-all systems and 
>uses it to elect its internal leaders.
>
>11. Dopp: "Could deliver unreasonable outcomes
."
>
>Unreasonable outcomes are less likely with IRV 
>than with any other single-seat voting method in 
>use today. Every single voting method ever 
>proposed can deliver "unreasonable outcomes" in 
>some scenarios, but real-world experience has 
>shown IRV to be one of the best methods. The 
>overwhelming number of election method experts 
>agree that IRV is fairer and more democratic 
>than plurality voting even if some might prefer 
>other theoretical voting methods. The American 
>Political Science Association (the national 
>association of political science professors) has 
>incorporated IRV into their own constitution for 
>electing their own national president. Robert’s 
>Rules of Order recommends IRV over plurality voting.
>
>12. Dopp: “Not all ballots are treated equally
”
>
>This charge reveals a lack of understanding of 
>how IRV works. All ballots are treated equally. 
>Every one has one and only one vote in each 
>round of counting. Just as in a traditional 
>runoff, your ballot counts first for your 
>favorite candidate and continues to count for 
>that candidate as long as he or she has a chance to win.
>Your rankings should be considered as backup 
>choices. Your ballot will only count for one of 
>your lesser preferences if your favorite 
>candidate has been eliminated. Every ballot 
>counts as one vote for your highest ranked 
>candidate who is still in the running in every round of counting.
>
>Note that courts have upheld IRV for this very 
>reason and Robert’s Rules of Order recommends it 
>over plurality voting. For quotations from a 
>court decision upholding IRV's equal treatment 
>of ballots, please see <1> below.
>
>13. Dopp: “Costly. 
”
>
>The two main expenses associated with the 
>transition to IRV are voting equipment upgrades 
>and voter education. Both of these are one-time 
>costs that will be quickly balanced out by the 
>savings coming from eliminating a runoff 
>election in each election cycle. In San 
>Francisco, for example, the city and county 
>saved approximately $3 million by not holding a 
>separate runoff election in 2005, easily 
>covering the mostly one-time costs spent in 2003-2004 to implement the system.
>
>In North Carolina, counties spent $3.5 million 
>for the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
>runoff in 2004, an election with a statewide 
>turnout of only 3%. In 2007, IRV elections in 
>Cary (NC) avoided the need for a runoff in one 
>of the city council districts that would have cost taxpayers $28,000.
>
>An effective voter education program can also be 
>done for relatively little money by learning 
>from what types of education worked well in 
>other jurisdictions and what types did not – 
>with the biggest factors being a good ballot 
>design, clear voter instructions and effective 
>pollworker training, in that order. In a report 
>to the Vermont General Assembly, the Vermont 
>Secretary of State estimated that, based on how 
>well IRV was implemented in Vermont’s largest 
>city of Burlington in 2006, voter education for 
>statewide IRV in Vermont would cost less than 
>$0.25 per registered voter. In a city of more 
>than 100,000 people, Cary spent less than 
>$10,000 on voter education – with highly favorable reactions from voters.
>
>14. Dopp: “Increases the potential for 
>undetectable vote fraud and erroneous vote counts
"
>
>Actually, just the opposite is true, so long as 
>paper ballots (such as optical scan) are used. 
>The reason that any attempts at fraud are easier 
>to detect with IRV is that there is a redundant 
>electronic record (called a ballot image) of 
>each ballot that can be matched one-to-one with 
>the corresponding paper ballot. Cities such as 
>San Francisco (CA) and Burlington (VT) release 
>these ballot files so that any voter can do 
>their own count. Without such redundant ballot 
>records (which are not typical with vote-for-one 
>elections) there is no way to know for certain 
>if the paper ballots have been altered prior to a recount.
>
>15. Dopp: “Violates some election fairness principles
."
>
>This charge reveals either a general lack of 
>understanding, or intentional 
>miss-representation. Every single voting method 
>ever devised must violate some "fairness 
>principles" as some of these criteria are 
>mutually exclusive. Dopp's example in appendix B 
>of "Arrow's fairness condition" (the Pareto 
>Improvement Criterion) completely misunderstands 
>the criterion, and gives an example that has no 
>relevance to it (and contrary to her 
>implication, IRV complies with this criterion). 
>IRV works essentially the same as a traditional 
>runoff election to find a majority winner. When 
>the field narrows to the two finalists in the 
>final instant runoff count, the candidate with 
>more support (ranked more favorably on more 
>ballots) will always win. Some theoretical 
>voting methods may satisfy some "fairness' 
>criteria, such as monotonicity, but then violate 
>other more important criteria such as the 
>majority criterion, or the later-no-harm criterion.
>
>Endnotes
>
><1> The rank order ballot used in instant runoff 
>voting (and other voting systems) is known by 
>political scientists as the "single transferable 
>vote" or STV. This balloting procedure has been 
>consistently upheld in United States courts as 
>constitutional and upholding the "one person, 
>one vote" principle. As an example, here is what 
>the Michigan Court ruled in upholding the use of 
>instant runoff voting in an Ann Arbor, Michigan 
>Mayoral race in a 1975 challenge:
>
>"Under the "M.P.V. System" [IRV], however, no 
>one person or voter has more than one effective 
>vote for one office. No voter's vote can be 
>counted more than once for the same candidate. 
>In the final analysis, no voter is given greater 
>weight in his or her vote over the vote of 
>another voter, although to understand this does 
>require a conceptual understanding of how the 
>effect of a "M.P.V. System" is like that of a 
>run-off election. The form of majority 
>preferential voting employed in the City of Ann 
>Arbor's election of its Mayor does not violate 
>the one-man, one-vote mandate nor does it 
>deprive anyone of equal protection rights under 
>the Michigan or United States Constitutions."
>
>page 11, Stephenson v Ann Arbor Board of City Canvassers File No. 75-10166 AW
>Michigan Circuit Court for the County of Jackson
>
>The Judge also observed on page 7,
>
>"Each voter has the same right at the time he 
>casts his or her ballot. Each voter has his or 
>her ballot counted once in any count that 
>determines whether one candidate has a majority 
>of the votes. . . . Far better to have the 
>People's will expressed more adequately in this 
>fashion, than to wonder what would have been the 
>results of a run-off election not provided for."

to be continued with "Dopp: 4. “Confuses voters
”"