[Election-Methods] a strategy-free range voting variant?

Peter Barath peb at freemail.hu
Sun Jul 20 06:31:53 PDT 2008


>4. For each option, determine the probability P(Y) of being a
> randomly chosen "benchmark" voter's favourite. These probabilities
> build the "benchmark lottery".
>
>5. Finally, the voting accounts are adjusted like this:
>
>a) Each deciding voter's account is increased by an amount equal to
> the total rating difference between the winner and the benchmark
> lottery amoung the *other* deciding voters, minus some fixed fee F,
> say 10*N^(1/2). (Note that the resulting adjustment may be positive
> or negative.)

This is the part I understand the least.

Let's imagine the following votes from the deciding voters:

10 million:   Nader: 10   Gore:  5   Bush:  0
41 million:   Gore:  10   Nader: 5   Bush:  0
49 million:   Bush:  10   Gore:  5   Nader: 0

Let's say that the lottery winner was Bush. The real winner
is going to be Gore, with 705 million voting money units,
while Bush has only 490 million. The total rating difference
is 215 million. Do you want to modify each deciding voter's
account with that big amount?

You can try to diminish this modification by the fixed fee but
I guess the modification will still be very high, because you are
not able to precisely predict the votes not to mention who the
lottery winner is going to be.

And I guess if you try to eliminate this huge voting money
transfer by some averaging operation, you will bite your
other finger by ruining the strategy-freeness.

Even if these worries are valid, this random partitioning of the
electorate looks a witty idea, worth some other trials.

I also like the idea of voting money, but with some reservations;
if the value of the voting money is not bound exactly to some
real value, then good-bye, strategy-freeness, I guess.

Otherways, voting money can be used even with the classical
Clarke-tax. Yes, Clarke-tax goes to one direction, but every
voter on every day can get one voting money unit.

If my voting money does not grows (except by votings), I will
use the most amount of it when I'm afraid to die soon - why
keep them if I can't use them?. So there seems to be some
extra voting power on the part of the deadly ill.

Peter Barath

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